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Abstract
Two duopolists compete in price on the market for a homoge-
neous product. They can ‘profile’ consumers, i.e., identify their val-
uations with some probability. If both firms can profile consumers
but with different abilities, then they achieve positive expected profits
at equilibrium. This provides a rationale for firms to (partially and
unequally) share data about consumers, or for data brokers to sell dif-
ferent customer analytics to competing firms. Consumers prefer that
both firms profile exactly the same set of consumers, or that only one
firm profiles consumers, as this entails marginal cost pricing (so does
a policy requiring list prices to be public). Otherwise, more protective
privacy regulations have ambiguous effects on consumer surplus.
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1 Introduction
Context. Advances in digital technology have greatly facilitated firms’ ac-
cess to detailed information on consumers’ willingness to pay. This has im-
proved their ability to offer personalized prices and, potentially, to raise their
profitability. Shiller (2014) provides empirical evidence that web browsing
data gives firms more information on consumer willingness to pay compared
to ‘old school’ demographic data, which increases profits by around 12.2%.
Similarly, a report of McKinsey&Company (2016) shows that finer data an-
alytics has improved customer segmentation and firm’s profitability, while
Mikians et al. (2012) empirically demonstrate the existence of personalized
pricing. In addition, firms are also more open nowadays regarding their use
of differential pricing strategies.1 On the other hand, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that consumers are not always aware that other prices may be available
to them, or that even if they are aware, it may be (too) costly to obtain ac-
cess to a lower price. This paves the way for firms to price discriminate
some consumers against others by selling the same good at different prices
to different consumers.
Against this backdrop, we want to revisit price competition in data-rich
environments where firms are able to profile customers and potentially differ
in their ability to do so. Differences in abilities to profile consumers could
come from different capacities to collect and analyze data (think of Amazon
or Alibaba vs smaller online shops).2 This could also be due to having
obtained different customer analytics from data collecting and processing
companies, so-called ‘data brokers’.3
1For instance, Ant Financial Services Group (the financing unit of Alibaba) announced
in 2015 the launch of Sesame Credit, a credit-scoring service that leverages big data and
customer behavior analytics to calculate personalized interest rates for micro loans or
personalized premiums for insurance services; see Business Wire (2015). See also European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2019) for a review of how motor and
health insurance companies use big data for pricing.
2BenMark et al. (2017) describe the expertise that firms must develop to be effective
in applying differential-pricing solutions.
3One such data broker is the Belgian Realdolmen, which clearly details on its website
that it offers ‘tailored’ data services (see http://www.realdolmen.com/tactical-ict/
ict-trends/big-data, accessed on January 25, 2018). Interestingly, Realdolmen is par-
tially controlled by Belgian supermarket chain Colruyt. One may speculate that Colruyt,
given its privileged relationship with Realdolmen, may have an advantage when it comes
to obtaining information about potential consumers compared to other companies, includ-
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More precisely, we study a model of price competition between firms in
a homogenous good setting. Thanks to a clever use of big data, firms are
able to ‘profile’ consumers, i.e., to identify their willingness to pay. Yet,
they can only do this imperfectly : there is always a positive probability that
any particular consumer will remain anonymous. This may be due to the
available data being not sufficiently precise, or to consumers acting to protect
their privacy.4 Firms then charge a personalized price to those consumers
that they are able to profile, while setting a ‘uniform’ price for all consumers
who remain anonymous. Consumers may observe that firms charge different
prices, but it is assumed that they can only buy at the price they have been
individually offered.
We assume that firms have correlated abilities to profile consumers, which
makes sense if they both use the services of the same data broker or if they
share the data that one of them collected. In this setting, we address the
following questions: Is being able to profile consumers enough to obtain
market power through price discrimination in a duopolistic setting? If the
firms’ profiling ability depends on the data they need to purchase from a data
broker, would this data broker sell these data exclusively to one firm? Is an
improved profiling ability good or bad news for consumers? If consumers
would have the option to hide their characteristics, would they like to do
so? If uniform prices were observable (‘list prices’) would this lead to more
competition?
Main results. Without the possibility to price discriminate, price compe-
tition in uniform prices would result in marginal cost pricing, the classical
Bertrand Paradox. Yet, having the ability to profile consumers does not au-
tomatically translate into market power. It only does so when both firms
have the ability to profile consumers but they do not always profile the same
consumers. The mechanism that yields market power in our model relies
on the strategic effect of the firms’ uniform prices (set in stage 1) on both
firms’ personalized prices. Indeed, there will be a positive probability that
the better informed firm recognizes consumers the other firm does not and
this firm can thus guarantee positive profits as long as the uniform price of
the less informed firm is above the marginal cost. Hence, when the latter
increases its uniform price, competitive pressure on ‘profiled’ consumers de-
ing its competitors. This advantage may translate into asymmetric abilities to profile and
target consumers.
4Consumers can use obfuscation strategies such as clearing cookies from their browsers,
logging off their Google and Facebook accounts, or adopting proxy servers or ad-blockers.
In our baseline model, we take such hiding as exogenous; in Section 5, we discuss how our
results could be affected if hiding was endogenized.
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creases. Therefore, the less-informed firm will always have an incentive to set
a uniform price above its cost, yielding a price equilibrium that displays mar-
ket power. This mechanism breaks down in two scenarios: when both firms
always profile the exact same set of consumers and when the less informed
firm can never profile any consumer. In these two cases, the only equilibrium
is the Bertrand paradox, where both firms charge all consumers a price equal
to marginal cost (irrespective of consumers being profiled or not). Hence,
having the ability to price discriminate against profiled consumers does not
necessarily imply market power.
Yet, our analysis also indicates that firms are likely to escape these sit-
uations in which the Bertrand Paradox continues to prevail. It is indeed in
the interest of any data provider to make sure that both firms are able to
profile consumers, albeit with different abilities to do so. If data about con-
sumers is collected by one of the firms, our results show that this firm has an
incentive to share part of this data with its competitor, so as to relax price
competition. If data brokers are the data providers, they will find it optimal
to provide data services of different ‘quality’ (in terms of profiling ability)
to the two firms. That is, data brokers will ‘tailor’ their data services in a
non-exclusive way, not to satisfy the ‘needs’ of the firms that demand data
services, but rather to soften price competition in the product market and,
thereby, increase the firms’ willingness to pay for their services.
We also assess how competitive differential pricing affects consumers. Ob-
viously, consumers are hurt as soon as firms are both able to profile them
but in differentiated ways, as equilibrium prices are then set above marginal
cost. The more interesting question is how consumers are affected when the
firms’ profiling abilities are improved or become more similar. To address this
question, we focus on the simpler case of perfectly correlated ‘profiling tech-
nologies’; in this case, any consumer profiled by the so-called ‘less-informed’
firm is also profiled by the so-called ‘better-informed’ firm, but the reverse
is not true. In this setting, we provide a set of comparative statics results
with respect to the precision of the profiling technology and the degree of
asymmetry between firms’ profiling technologies. We show that increasing
the precision of profiling technologies increases both uniform and personal-
ized prices, leading to instances in which some profiled consumers are right
to fear that they are being priced closer to their ‘pain point’ compared to the
uniform price they would receive if they would be able to hide. This provides
incentives to hide so as to avoid excessive prices, i.e., there is a demand for
privacy. However, some consumers may gain from improved profiling, namely
those consumers with a low valuation, who start purchasing (and enjoying
a positive surplus) when they are no longer anonymous; as what they gain
may outweigh what other consumers lose, improved profiling may lead to an
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overall increase in consumer surplus.
We then show that reducing the asymmetry between firms’ profiling tech-
nologies has a non-monotone effect on the uniform prices. More specifically,
uniform prices are at their highest level for an intermediate level of asym-
metry.5 We also establish that for given uniform prices, personalized prices
decrease as firms’ profiling technologies become more symmetric, which is
due to the higher intensity of competition between firms for consumers pro-
filed by both firms. This has interesting implications for consumer surplus.
For relatively high levels of symmetry between firms’ profiling technologies,
further increasing the symmetry benefits the consumers as it leads to both
lower uniform prices and lower personalized prices. For relatively low lev-
els of symmetry, however, increasing the symmetry leads to higher uniform
prices but lower personalized prices.
We finally confirm that when consumers can always purchase the product
at the ‘list’ price, competitive pressure is higher. The intuition is simple: a
firm that wants to price discriminate does not just compete against the prices
of its competitor but also against its own uniform price. The effect is very
stark in our model: marginal cost pricing prevails again at the subgame-
perfect equilibrium, bringing us back in the Bertrand Paradox. Firms thus
have incentives to prevent consumers from having access to multiple prices.
In addition, we show in a simplified version of our model in which consumers
can only be of two types, that no other (mixed strategy) subgame-perfect
equilibrium exists.
Related literature. Price competition with imperfect profiling has rarely
been studied in an oligopoly setting before. Either imperfect price discrimi-
nation is considered in a monopoly setting, as done recently by Belleflamme
and Vergote (2016), and Valletti and Wu (2016). Or oligopolistic competition
is introduced, but with restricted discrimination abilities for the competing
firms. Seminal papers are Thisse and Vives (1988), Corts (1998), Liu and
Serfes (2004), Encaoua and Hollander (2007); see also Taylor and Wagman
(2014) for a synthesis, Kehoe et al. (2018) for an analysis of the impacts of
big data on price competition in an oligopoly market for branded experience
goods, and Kim et al. (2019) for an analysis of the effects of consumer profiling
on merger analysis. In this literature, the choice given to firms is often be-
tween the two extremes of perfect discrimination and uniform pricing; when
third-degree price discrimination (i.e., group pricing) is considered, the focus
is on symmetric situations where firms have the same ability to discriminate.
One exception is Chen and Iyer (2002), who study price competition under
5This result, which holds generally, contributes to explain why firms are willing to share
data and data brokers to tailor their services.
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imperfect consumer addressability and establish price dispersion in equilib-
rium. This paper differs from Chen and Iyer (2002) in two ways. First, we
fully characterize the two stage price competition equilibrium with uniform
price and personalized price.6 Second, the strategic uncertainty that firms
face come from a different source: in Chen and Iyer (2002), imperfect ad-
dressability makes each firm uncertain as to whether it is competing with the
other firm or not (similar to Varian (1980), and Burdett and Judd (1983)),
whereas in our paper, imperfect profiling makes each firm not sure about the
pricing strategy of the other firm, while knowing that competition is always
present. Our paper is also related to classical papers on targeted advertising
such as Shaffer and Zhang (2002) and Iyer et al. (2005). In these papers, firms
have perfect information about consumers’ preferences and decide on which
segment of consumers to target their advertisement. Asymmetric targeting
arises as part of the equilibrium to limit the intensity of price competition,
whilst firms have the same ability to target. Our paper, however, allows firms
to differ in their ability to profile and focus on varying the intensity of price
discrimination.7
Our paper also provides some important insights into the debate on pri-
vacy regulation. An early contribution, Calzolari and Pavan (2006), focuses
on the incentives of firms to share private information about consumers.
More recently, the literature on targeting and privacy has grown consider-
ably, triggered by advances in digital tracking; see Acquisti et al. (2016) for
a survey. However, this literature focuses on independent targeting, whereas
we study correlated targeting. Also, by covering the whole spectrum from
no discrimination to perfect discrimination, and by letting firms differ in
their intensity of price discrimination, we are able to shed new light on issues
related to privacy.
This paper further relates to the literature that studies the incentives
of data brokers. For example, Braulin and Valletti (2016) and Montes et al.
(2019) also consider competitive targeting. However, there are two important
differences. First, we consider homogeneous products, whereas they consider
differentiated products. Second, we examine the mixed strategies equilibria
under different ‘degrees’ of asymmetry and correlation in profiling technolo-
gies, but they focus on the pure strategies equilibria under perfectly asym-
6Chen and Iyer (2002) mainly characterize the price competition equilibrium in person-
alized prices. They briefly discuss price competition in both uniform price and personal-
ized price in Section 5, but with consumers observing both uniform prices and personalized
prices.
7Moreover, our model differs with respect to discount and poaching models (e.g., Villas-
Boas (1999)), as firms here can set personalized prices above the previously set uniform
price.
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metric profiling technologies (i.e., one firm is unable to profile consumers).
When products are differentiated vertically (Braulin and Valletti (2016)) and
horizontally (Montes et al. (2019)), they find that the data broker finds it
profitable to sell its data exclusively to only one firm. We, however, show
that the ability to profile is irrelevant to market power if firms’ profiling tech-
nologies are fully symmetric (and perfectly correlated) or fully asymmetric,
as the Bertrand paradox prevails in both cases. Because of this, we find that
in contrast to the result of Braulin and Valletti (2016) and Montes et al.
(2019), the data broker may have incentives to sell its data to all competing
firms, as long as firms end up with different abilities to profile consumers.
Another example is Jentzsch et al. (2013), who study price discrimination
in two dimensions (group and individual price discrimination) in a Hotelling
model. However, they do not study the effect of imperfect profiling; that is,
in their model, each firm knows its rival’s information set. Therefore, price
discrimination arises in equilibrium but not price dispersion, though they
also find that partial information sharing is profitable for firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our
modeling framework. In Section 3, we solve the model for its subgame-perfect
equilibrium and explain why competitive differential pricing may relax com-
petition. We then derive the implications of our results for data markets
(Section 4) and for consumers (Section 5). Finally, in Section 6, we draw
some policy and empirical implications from our analysis.
2 The model
We consider a market where two firms produce a homogeneous product at
a constant marginal cost, which is set to zero for simplicity. We describe
in turn the main assumptions regarding consumers and firms, as well as the
timing of the game.
Consumers. There is a unit mass of consumers who vary in the valuation
that they attach to the homogeneous product. The valuation of consumer x
is noted r(x), which is randomly and independently drawn according to the
distribution function F (.) : R→ [0, 1] with support [0, r¯], and with associated
continuously differentiable density function f(.) : R → R. Consumers wish
to purchase at most one unit of the product and they do so from the firm that
offers the lowest price (we say more on this below). Noting this price p, we can
express the expected demand from consumer x at p as the probability that the
consumer has a valuation that is at least as large as p, i.e. prob(r(x) > p).
This probability is given by the survival function S(.) : R → [0, 1] where
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S(p) = 1−F (p). Since we assume that the mass of consumers is equal to 1 and
that valuations are drawn independently, the survival function also represents
the aggregate expected demand (referred to hereafter as the ‘demand’). We
impose the additional assumption that demand is log-concave: S ′(p)/S(p) =
−h(p) is non-increasing in p, where h(p) is the hazard rate.
Firms. Each firm has access to a ‘profiling technology’ that allows it to
identify the valuation of a consumer probabilistically. When a firm identifies
the valuation of a consumer, it is in a position to price discriminate and
charge this consumer a personalized price. For the consumers that a firm
does not profile, the firm sets a uniform price.
Without loss of generality, assume that the probability of identifying the
valuation of a consumer is equal to λA = λ ∈ [0, 1] for firm A and λB = βλ
for firm B, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The parameter λ can be interpreted as a
measure of firm A’s ability to profile consumers. Alternatively, 1 − λ can
be interpreted as the capacity of consumers to hide from firm A. As for
the parameter β, it measures the degree of symmetry between the firms’
profiling technologies: if β = 1, firms have symmetric technologies (they are
‘equally’ informed); for any β < 1, firm B’s is at a disadvantage with respect
to firm A in terms of profiling consumers (firm A is the ‘better-informed’
firm and firm B, the ‘less-informed’ firm).
Let us now determine the probabilities for a given consumer x to be
profiled by both firms, only one of them, or none of them. To this end,
we denote by a (resp. b) the conditional probability that firm A (resp. B)
profiles any consumer x in the event that firm B (resp. A) does so as well. To
allow for any degree of (positive) correlation between these two conditional




parameter φ is a measure of the correlation of the profiling technologies:
the higher its value, the more correlated the technologies. At the lower bound
(φ = 1), the profiling technologies are independent, while at the upper bound
(φ = 1
λ
), the technologies are perfectly correlated (i.e., firm A’s technology
profiles any consumer that firm B profiles as well, but not vice versa).
We can now compute the jointly correlated profiling probabilities for
a given consumer. Let M2 denote the probability that both firms pro-
file the consumer, MK the probability that only firm K profiles the con-
sumer (K = A,B), and M0 the probability that no firm profiles the con-
sumer. Using the previous definitions, we have:9 M2 = aλB = bλA = βφλ
2,
8We would in general expect that the profiling technologies of firms are correlated:
when one firm profiles a consumer, it increases the chances that the other firm will do so
as well.
9The conditions λ, β ∈ [0, 1] and φ ∈ [1, 1λ] ensure that all four probabilities are between
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MA = (1− b)λA = λ (1− βφλ), MB = (1− a)λB = βλ (1− φλ), and
M0 = 1− (M2 +MA +MB) = 1− λ− βλ (1− φλ).
As we set the total a mass of consumers equal to unity, the latter proba-
bilities can also be seen as the respective masses of consumers in four distinct
market segments. To ease the exposition, we name these segments as follows:
the ‘transparent ’ segment (with mass M2) comprises those consumers that
both firms have profiled; the ‘K-translucent ’ segment (with mass MK) com-
prises those consumers that only firm K has profiled; the ‘opaque’ segment
(with mass M0) comprises those consumers that no firm has profiled. For
future reference, we note that there are three particular instances in which
the B-translucent segment is empty: (i) β = 0 (firm B cannot profile any
consumer; in this case, we also have M2 = 0), (ii) λ = 1 (firm A is able to
profile all consumers; in this case, we also have M0 = 0), (iii) φ = 1/λ (profil-
ing technologies are perfectly correlated). As for the A-translucent segment,
the only instance in which it is empty is when φ = 1/λ and β = 1 (profiling
technologies are perfectly correlated and equivalent).
Timing of the game. Before the game starts, the firms acquire their pro-
filing technology, with respective precisions λA and λB. The values (λA, λB)
are assumed to be common knowledge.10 In the first stage of the game, firms
set their uniform price pK , with K ∈ {A,B}, for the consumers that they are
not able to profile. In the second stage, after observing the uniform prices,
firms set personalized prices for the consumers that their profiling technology
allows them to profile; these prices are noted pK(x), with x referring to the
identity of the consumer with valuation r (x). This assumption can be jus-
tified in several ways. First, a sequential price setting is commonly assumed
in the literature (see Thisse and Vives (1988)). Second, it also reflects the
relative flexibility in the adjustment of personalized prices compared to uni-
form prices (see, e.g., Choe et al. (2018)). Finally, as we show in the analysis,
simultaneous pricing would lead firms back to the Bertrand paradox.
In the third stage, consumers decide whether or not to buy the product,
and from which firm to buy after observing the price offered to them by
each firm. We assume that consumers receive only one price offer from each
firm, either a uniform or a personalized price. As a consequence, profiled
consumers are not able to arbitrage between their personalized price and
the uniform price. This assumption is reasonable if price offers are sent out
electronically and if consumers have to incur a sufficiently high search cost
0 and 1.
10For now, we take the firms’ profiling technologies as exogenous. In Section 4, we discuss
how to endogenize the technologies by letting firms share datasets or by introducing data
brokers in the game.
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to know about the uniform price. The fact that profiled consumers do not
(or have a hard time to) observe uniform prices is not incompatible with the
fact that firms do observe each other’s uniform price. Firms may indeed infer
the other firm’s uniform price by using sophisticated technologies (such as
robots) that are not accessible to consumers.11,12 We also need to set a couple
of tie-breaking rules to decide how consumers choose when firms charge them
the exact same price. For this, we assume that although consumers observe
only one price from a given firm, they can determine whether this price is a
personalized price or a uniform price. If both firms quote the same price but
one price is personalized while the other is a uniform price, we assume that
the consumer chooses the firm offering the personalized price. If both prices
are the same and of the same nature (both personalized or both uniform),
then we assume that the consumer chooses to purchase from each firm with
equal probability.13
11This is a common assumption made in the literature. It has been justified in the
brick-and-mortar world in which regular prices are viewed as more of a strategic variable
than promotions. Arguably, this justification may seem less convincing for the online
world that we consider in our paper (as prices can be changed more easily). However,
it remains true in the online world that uniform (regular) prices are made public, while
personalized prices are, by nature, only visible to the targeted consumers. We are thus
confident that in the online world as well, the uniform price is a more long-term variable
than the personalized prices (which have a more tactical role). It is also true that, even if
uniform prices are published, they are harder to find for consumers than for firms (which
have more sophisticated tools at their disposal). For instance, it appears that in the US,
finding prices is very difficult for consumers in the health sector, even when firms have the
legal obligation to publish prices (see Quito and Shendruk (2019)).
12The sequence of pricing decisions could also be justified as the equilibrium outcome
of the following game. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to commit to their
uniform price before setting their personalized prices (commitment is achieved by pub-
lishing the price). In the second stage, firms set prices, not being able to change their
uniform price if they committed to it in stage one. From the main results of our paper,
it follows that, if the commitment costs are small enough, there are two pure-strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this game: either both firms commit or none of them
does. Clearly, the equilibrium in which both firms commit is Pareto-dominant and we can
thus expect firms to find ways to coordinate on this equilibrium.
13There is evidence showing that consumers may favor either the personalized price or
the uniform price. For instance, Wattal et al. (2012) find a negative effect of personalization
in e-mails due to privacy intrusion, whereas Feld et al. (2013) find a positive effect of
name personalization in direct mail. Using the other tie-breaking rule slightly complicates
matters but should not change anything qualitatively: although the equilibrium price
distribution of targeted prices will be different, they will generate the same expected
payoff.
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3 Why competitive differential pricing relaxes
competition
We establish here our main result: although firms compete in prices on the
market for a homogeneous product, they obtain positive profits at equilibrium
whenever they are both able to profile consumers but not the exact same set of
consumers. In other words, competitive differential pricing allows, in general,
the duopolists to escape the so-called Bertrand paradox.
Before establishing this result formally, let us discuss the intuition behind
it. The major force driving the result is the uncertainty that the two firms
face regarding the pricing strategy of their competitor. In particular, when
one firm (say firm A) profiles some consumer, it is uncertain as to whether
the other firm has profiled her as well or not. Firm A knows that with
probability 1− b, firm B did not profile this consumer (who belongs then to
the A-translucent segment) and offered her its uniform price pB; in that case,
firm A can win this consumer with an appropriate personalized price and
assure itself positive profits. However, with probability b, firm B did profile
the consumer, which implies that both firms compete then for this consumer
through personalized prices (we are then on the transparent segment).14
We show below that this uncertainty leads firms to set positive (i.e.,
above marginal cost) personalized prices, most often in a randomized way.
This means that the second-stage equilibrium yields positive expected profits
from profiling for both firms. What is key is that these expected profits
increase with the uniform prices that firms set in the first stage of the game.
The intuition is simple: as indicated above, a firm that profiles a consumer
can secure a positive profit by undercutting the competitor’s uniform price
in the event that the competitor does not profile this consumer; hence, the
higher the competitor’s uniform price, the larger the expected profit.
Moving now to the first-stage of the game, it becomes clear that, antic-
ipating what we just showed, firms will never set a uniform price equal to
marginal cost (zero in this model); if they were, they would lose any chance
to make profits from the consumers that they manage to profile. This com-
pletes the argument, as it proves that all prices (uniform and personalized)
will be set above marginal cost.
Yet, we should not forget that firms can only charge their uniform price
to the consumers that they fail to profile. Hence, the competition for these
consumers drives uniform prices down (in the traditional Bertrand fashion).
14The same goes for any consumer that firm B profiles, as this consumer could be-
long either to the B-translucent segment or to the transparent segment (with respective
probabilities 1− a and a).
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When choosing its uniform price, each firm will thus balance two opposite
inclinations: lower the price to be more competitive on the opaque segment
and on the competitor’s translucent segment, but raise it to relax competition
on the other two segments (where it can set personalized prices). This trade-
off may lead firms to randomize uniform prices as well.
In short, the possibility to price discriminate together with uncertainty
about the nature of price discrimination competition (did only one firm iden-
tify the consumer or did they both?), generates strictly positive prices and
possible randomization of all prices. Let us now establish this result more
formally.
3.1 Personalized pricing equilibrium
We first study the optimal personalized prices, given the observed uniform
prices (pA, pB). That is, we focus on the competition that takes place on the
transparent segment (of mass M2 = βφλ
2) and the two translucent segments
(of respective masses MA = λ (1− βφλ) and MB = βλ (1− φλ)). In other
words, firms choose their personalized prices (pA(x), pB(x)) for the consumers
that they–and possibly their competitor–have identified.
As a first step, we establish that if the uniform prices are equal to marginal
cost, so are the personalized prices.
Lemma 1. If (pA, pB) = (0, 0), then (pA(x), pB(x)) = (0, 0) is the unique
equilibrium at the second stage of the game.
Proof. Clearly, pA(x) = 0 is a (weakly) best reply to pB(x) = 0 and vice
versa. Thus we can conclude that (pA(x), pB(x)) = (0, 0) is a Nash equilib-
rium. No other equilibrium in pure strategies can exist, since there would
be a profitable deviation. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. The support of these strategies must contain only strictly positive
prices (and be symmetric). But then, the upper limit of the support must
have positive mass. If not, playing this price will yield an expected payoff
of zero. Yet, for any point with positive mass in the support, there is an
incentive to slightly undercut this price as to increase profit.
We now show that when at least one uniform price is above marginal
cost, then so are the equilibrium personalized prices, meaning that firms can
achieve positive expected profits on the segments on which they profile con-
sumers. To state the result, we define pxB ≡ min {pB, r (x)} as the maximum
personalized price that firm A can set to attract consumer x when firm B does
not profile this consumer; as the latter event occurs with conditional proba-
bility 1−b, firm A can secure an expected profit of (1−b)pxB for any consumer
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belonging to the A-translucent segment. We define pxA ≡ min {pA, r (x)} ac-
cordingly; then, the expected profit that firm B can secure from consumers
on the B-translucent segment is equal to (1 − a)pxA. In what follows, we
assume (without loss of generality) that (1 − b)pxB ≥ (1 − a)pxA.15 The next
proposition describes the second-stage equilibrium when at least one first-
stage uniform price is strictly above marginal cost (the proof with the full
characterization can be found in Appendix 7.1).
Proposition 1. Given uniform prices pA and pB, and r(x), and assuming
that (1− b)pxB > 0, then
• If (1−b)pxB > (1−a)pxA, there exists a unique second-stage personalized
pricing equilibrium with the following features:
1. If pxA/p
x
B ≤ a(1 − b), the equilibrium is in mixed strate-
gies, firm A has an expected payoff of (1 − b)pxB and firm B has
an expected payoff of a(1− b)pxB;
2. If a(1− b) < pxA/pxB < 1− b, the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies if pxA/p
x
B < a or in pure strategies otherwise; in any
case, firm A has an expected payoff of (1 − b)pxB and firm B has
an expected payoff of pxA;
3. If pxA/p
x
B ≥ 1 − b, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies
and both firms have an expected payoff of (1− b)pxB.
• If (1 − b)pxB = (1 − a)pxA there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in
which both firms have an expected payoff of (1− b)pxB = (1− a)pxA.
At first glance, the price equilibrium in mixed strategies described in
Proposition 1 could be seen as a replay of the logic proposed by Varian (1980),
with captive consumers (who only know the price of one firm) and shoppers
(who know both prices). Yet, the driver of price randomization in our setting
is not consumers’ information about pricing, but firms’ information about
the consumer segments to which their prices are being targeted; that is,
when one firm targets a customer, it does not know whether it has unique
knowledge of the customer’s valuation or whether there is competition from
the other firm.
15The construction of the unique Nash equilibrium when (1 − a)pxA < (1 − b)pxB , as
detailed in Appendix 7.1, does not depend on the assumption that a > b. In other words,
the equilibrium we construct does not depend on the identity of the firm A or B: If
(1− a)pxA > (1− b)pxB , we obtain an equivalent proposition by interchanging pA and pB ,
as well as the parameters a and b in Proposition 1.
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3.2 Uniform pricing equilibrium
While Lemma 1 states that marginal cost pricing can be a Nash equilibrium
of the two stage pricing game, Proposition 1 suggests that it cannot be a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The reason is the following: firms can
expect strictly positive profits at the second stage of the game as soon as
at least one uniform price is strictly positive; hence, a forward-looking firm
cannot find it optimal to set its uniform price equal to marginal cost. There
are, however, two extreme cases in which this reasoning breaks down, as
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Marginal cost pricing, i.e., (pA, pB) = pA(x), pB(x)) = (0, 0), is
the unique SPNE of the game in either of the following two cases: (1) β = 0,
or (2) β = 1 and φ = 1/λ.
Proof. Proof. In case (1), as firm B is not able to identify any consumer,
only the opaque and the A-translucent segments exist. Suppose by contra-
diction that firm B sets pB > 0. Then, firm B does not make any sales on the
A-translucent segment because firm A can always undercut any offer pB > 0
with a personalized price. It follows that firm B competes only in the opaque
segment, on which Bertrand competition ensues: for any pB > 0, firm A has
an incentive to slightly undercut this price, which yields to a unique equi-
librium with (pA, pB) = (0, 0) and, by Lemma 1, (pA(x), pB(x)) = (0, 0). In
case (2),16 firms are symmetric: they identify exactly the same consumers
as their profiling technologies are perfectly correlated and equivalent. Be-
cause the two translucent segments are empty, all strategic links between
the opaque and transparent segments are severed. On the transparent seg-
ment, ‘classic’ Bertrand competition prevails for each and every consumer.
It follows that equilibrium personalized prices are (pA(x), pB(x)) = (0, 0)
for all x. This equilibrium outcome is independent of any uniform price pK
that may prevail on the opaque segment. As a consequence, competition for
consumers on the opaque segment is also equivalent to Bertrand competi-
tion, leading to uniform prices that also equal marginal cost in equilibrium:
(pA, pB) = (0, 0).
We now show that outside the two extreme cases of Lemma 2, firms have
market power at the SPNE of the game. As shown in Proposition 1, the
expected payoff for firm A in the second-stage equilibrium is an increasing
function of pxB. As a consequence, firm B faces a trade-off when raising its
uniform price in the first stage of the game: on the one hand, a higher pB
16Technically, Proposition 1 does not apply to this case: as b = φβλ = 1, it follows that
(1− b)pxB = 0, which violates one of the assumptions on which Proposition 1 relies.
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increases expected profits on the transparent and B-translucent segments
(as it induces firm A to increase its prices), but on the other hand, it lowers
expected profits on the opaque and A-translucent segment (as it makes it
easier for firm A to undercut B’s price).
Given this trade-off, one option for firm B is to focus exclusively on the
segments where it profiles consumers and to forgo any profit on the segments
where it does not profile any consumer. To do so, firm B simply needs to set
pB > pA for any pA. What would be firm B’s expected profit be under that
option? From Proposition 1, we know that the payoff firm B expects from
any consumer x is weakly increasing in pB. It follows that if firm B chooses
to focus only on consumers that it happens to profile, it will set the largest
possible uniform price: pB = r¯. We can then compute the profit that firm B
can expect for some pA set by firm A. Recalling that p
x
B ≡ min {pB, r (x)},
we have here that pxB = r (x). Now, applying Proposition 1, we know that
firm B’s profit is equal to:17
1. (1− b)r(x) for pxA/pxB ≥ 1− b, or r(x) ≤ pA/(1− b),
2. pA for a(1− b) < pxA/pxB < 1− b or pA/(1− b) < r(x) < pA/(a(1− b)),
and
3. a(1− b)r(x) for pxA/pxB ≤ a(1− b) or r(x) ≥ pA/(a(1− b)).














a (1− b) rf(r)dr.
(1)
As the total mass of the transparent and B-translucent segments is M2 +
MB = λB = βλ, this strategy will guarantee firm B, for some pA set by firm
A, an expected profit of
piminB (pA) = βλp˚iB(r¯, pA). (2)
If firm B chooses pB = r¯, then firm A’s best response is to set the
monopoly price, pm, which solves maxp pS (p).
18 This is so for two reasons.
First, firm A is the only active firm on the opaque and A- translucent seg-
ments since firm B priced itself out of these segments. Second, the uniform
price that firm A’s chooses bears no impact on the expected profit that it
obtains afterwards when setting its personalized prices (see Proposition 1).
17It is easily checked that pB = r¯ implies that (1− b)pxB ≥ (1− a)pxA.
18Our assumption that demand is log-concave makes sure that such price exists.
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We need now to examine under which condition setting pB = r¯ is firm
B’s best response when firm A sets pA = p
m. The best alternative for firm
B is to set pB = p
m − ε, so as to compete as well on the opaque and A-
translucent segments without sacrificing too much profit on the transparent
and B-translucent segments later on. What would be firm B’s expected profit
in that case? With probability M2 +MB, firm B competes for consumers on
the transparent and B-translucent segments, on which it obtains expected
profits (almost) equal to
p˚iB(p









With probability M0, it competes on the opaque segment and, as it slightly
undercuts firm A, it achieves profits (almost) equal to pim ≡ pmS (pm). Fi-
nally, with probability MA, it competes on the A-translucent segment, where
it makes (almost certainly) no sales and obtains (almost) zero profit. In sum,
firm B’s best expected deviation profit when firm A sets its uniform price
equal to the monopoly price is computed as
ΠeB(p
m)|pA=pm = βλp˚iB(pm, pm) + [1− λ− βλ (1− φλ)]pim. (3)
Hence, if piminB (p
m) ≥ ΠeB(pm)|pA=pm , there exists a pure-strategy equilib-
rium in which firm A is a monopolist in the segments where consumers are
not profiled or only by firm A, while firm B gives up any sales to consumers
it does not profile and chooses a uniform price that maximizes its expected
profits in the transparent segment. Using expression (2) and (3), we find
that piminB (p
m) ≥ ΠeB(pm)|pA=pm is equivalent to:
βλ [˚piB (r¯, p
m)− p˚iB (pm, pm)] ≥ (1− λ− βλ (1− φλ))pim. (4)
Otherwise, if Condition (4) is not met, firm B will choose to compete as
well for the consumers that it does not profile. But then, firm A will have
no reason to set the monopoly price. As competition ensues on the opaque
segment, both firms must randomize uniform prices, as it is the only way
for them to make positive profits and, thereby, to be indifferent with the
previous situation where firm B stays out of the opaque and A-translucent
segments (and firm A monopolizes them).
We have thus proven the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the first stage of the game, the pair (pA, pB) = (p
m, r¯)
is an equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if piminB (p
m) ≥ ΠeB(pm)|pA=pm,
which is equivalent to Condition (4). Otherwise, the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies.
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We now draw a number of insightful implications for data markets and
for consumers. Where needed, we will base our analysis on the specific case
of perfectly correlated profiling technologies, for which we are able to fully
characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
4 Implications for data markets
So far, we have not been very specific regarding the origin of the profiling
technologies. We have simply indicated that profiling was made possible by
the use of data and customer analytics; we also stated that it was reasonable
to assume that the two profiling technologies were correlated if firms had
access to ‘similar’ data sets. Two scenarios fit the latter assumption quite
well: either one of the firms collected data and, then, decided to share the
customer analytics with the other firm; or customer analytics was produced
by third parties (so-called ‘data brokers’) and then sold to the firms. In either
scenario, the data providers’ strategies on the supply side are shaped by the
data users’ willingness to pay on the demand side. Our previous results are
thus instrumental to shed light on the working of data markets, as they tell
us about the profits that competing firms can extract from their use of data
and customer analytics for differential pricing purposes.
A first important finding can be drawn from Lemma 2, which shows that
equilibrium profits are nil if either only one firm is able to profile consumers
(i.e., if β = 0), or both firms can profile the exact same set of consumers be-
cause their profiling technologies are symmetric and perfectly correlated (i.e.,
if β = 1 and φ = 1/λ). The immediate consequence is that any (for-profit)
data supplier will chose to provide both firms with differentiated customer
analytics. The fact that both firms should be provided with data implies,
in the first scenario, that a firm that collects data should share it with its
competitor; in the second scenario, it means that data brokers should avoid
exclusive data contracts, the opposite recommendation to the one drawn from
previous studies (see Braulin and Valletti (2016), and Montes et al. (2019)).
Regarding the necessary differentiation of the customer analytics, what
our model tells us is that data suppliers must make sure that the competing
firms end up profiling different sets of consumers. Analyzing the optimal
way to achieve this goes beyond the scope of this paper.19 However, we can
give useful indications as to how the asymmetry (β) and correlation (φ) of
the profiling technologies should be calibrated. As shown in Proposition 2,
19We cannot, in our limited setting, consider the full set of strategies that data suppliers
can choose from. For instance, they can divide customer data in overlapping or non-
overlapping tranches.
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the first stage of the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium if Condition (4)
is met. In this equilibrium, firm B chooses to maximize its profits on the
segments where it profiles consumers, while letting firm A monopolize the
other segments. As total (expected) profits are maximized in this equilib-
rium, it is in the interest of any data supplier to design its offering so that














βλ (1− βφλ) (φλr − pm) f (r) dr
≥ (1− λ− βλ (1− φλ)) pim.
(5)
In the case of perfectly correlated profiling technologies (φ = 1/λ), Condition
(5) boils down to∫ pm
1−β
pm




βλ (1− β) (r − pm) f (r) dr ≥ (1− λ) pim,
which can be rewritten as





where CSm ≡ ∫ r¯
pm
(r − pm) f (r) dr is the consumer surplus under (uniform)
monopoly pricing. As the right-hand side is independent of β, it is easily seen
that the latter condition is most likely to be satisfied when β = 1/2. Hence,
if data providers were to provide firms with perfectly correlated profiling
technologies, they would set the level of asymmetry between the technologies
at β = 1/2, so as to extract the largest rents from the firms. To understand
this result, note that an increase in β expands the set of customers that firmB
is able to profile, and so (other things being equal), linearly increases demand.
However, we show in Appendix 7.2 (where we develop the perfect correlation
case) that the lower bound to the price charged (and so the expected payoff
per customer) is proportional to 1− β. It follows that firm B’s profits from
profiled customers are proportional to β(1−β). So, one way to interpret the
previous result is to say that the higher the uncertainty about the information
20To see this, note that expected payoff from profiling for both firms (which happens
with joint probability mass M2 + MA + MB), is maximized when pB = r¯. In addition,
the payoff on the opaque segment (which occurs with probability 1−M2 +MA +MB) is
maximized when min{pA, pB} = pm. So, in any of the events (when there is profiling and
when there is none), the sum of expected profits of both firms is maximized.
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firm B has, the higher the prices (as it is precisely this uncertainty that drives
the randomization of prices); in the case of perfectly correlated technologies,
the maximum uncertainty is reached at β = 1/2.21






that it is optimal to have some level of asymmetry holds more generally
for a range of imperfectly correlated profiling technologies. Interestingly, we
can say a lot more in the case of a relatively high monopoly price, namely
pm ≥ (1− βφλ) r¯. Condition (5) simplifies then to∫ r¯
pm
βλ (1− βφλ) (r − pm) f (r) dr ≥ (1− λ− βλ (1− φλ))pim,
which is equivalent to
L (β) ≡ βλ (1− φβλ)− (1− λ− βλ (1− φλ))Rm ≥ 0,








with β∗ = 1/2 for φ = 1/λ and β∗ > 1/2 for φ < 1/λ. We see that it is
not optimal for data providers to propose symmetric profiling technologies
when profiling technologies are sufficiently correlated (which generalizes our
previous result); formally,






To sum up, our analysis of the differential pricing game gives us precious
information about the profits that firms can expect for a given pair of profiling
technologies. From there, we can evaluate the firms’ willingnesses to pay
for various offerings of customer analytics and so, the revenues that data
providers can achieve by providing these offerings. If the data provider is
one of the two firms, we show that it has an incentive to share its means to
profile consumers with its rival, but not entirely, so that the data provider
remains ‘better informed’ than its rival. This can be achieved by selling to the
rival a profiling technology that is imperfectly correlated and/or asymmetric
with the data provider’s technology. Intuitively, when the less-informed firm
21Interestingly, Ireland (1993) reaches a similar result in a different context. In his two-
stage Varian-like model, firms choose first the fraction of consumers who will be made
aware of their existence and next, the uniform price at which to sell their good.
19
has a very poor profiling ability compared to the better-informed firm, it
mainly competes in the opaque segment. So, improving the less-informed
firm’s ability enables it to also compete in the transparent segment, which in
turn relaxes competition in the opaque segment. However, when the profiling
abilities of the two firms are very similar, the two firms mainly compete in
the transparent segment. Improving the less-informed firm’s ability then
makes competition in the transparent segment even more intense, which in
turn leads to more competition in the opaque segment. The same intuition
applies when profiling technologies are sold by third-parties. A monopoly data
broker will follow the same logic and target the two firms with differentiated
offerings. Similarly, two data brokers who cannot offer themselves a menu of
options will vertically differentiate the offerings they sell at equilibrium.22
5 Implications for consumers
We investigate now how competitive differential pricing affects the surplus
of consumers. As the two firms produce a homogeneous product, we know
that in the absence of differential pricing, the unique Nash equilibrium is
such that prices are equal to marginal cost; consumer surplus reaches then
its maximum. We also know from Lemma 2 that the possibility to price
discriminate is not a sufficient condition for departing from this benchmark: if
only one firm can profile consumers or if both firms can profile the exact same
set of consumers, marginal cost pricing continues to prevail at equilibrium.
This means that for consumers to be hurt, both firms must profile con-
sumers but with different abilities. Yet, as we explained in the previous
section, this situation should be the norm rather than the exception, as it
serves the interests of data providers. It is thus legitimate to fear the neg-
ative impacts that the data revolution may have on consumer welfare, as
eloquently expressed by Newman (2013):
“The darker version of online marketing is that it can facilitate what
economists call ‘price discrimination,’ selling the same exact good at
a variety of prices in ways unknown to the buyers. This is based on
the reality that people have different maximum prices that they are
willing to pay, a so-called ‘pain point’ after which they won’t buy the
22In that case, the data broker who sells the offering leading to the best profiling ability
will earn more profits (ignoring investments costs). In Appendix 7.2, we show indeed
that when profiling technologies are perfectly correlated, the better-informed firm achieves
higher expected profits than the less-informed firm. By continuity, this result also applies
to highly but imperfectly correlated technologies.
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product. The ideal for a seller would be to sell a product to each
customer at their individual ‘pain point’ price without them knowing
that any other deal is available.”
Such fears have led the Council of Economic Advisers of the Whitehouse to
release a study on big data and differential pricing in 2015, in which it is
equally recognized that firms may be engaging in random price testing.23
How does our analysis contribute to this debate? Although it seems
extremely hard to perform a general analysis of the impacts of competitive
differential pricing on consumer surplus,24 we are able to shed some light on
a number of interesting issues when we focus on the specific case of perfectly
correlated profiling technologies.
In a nutshell, we show that consumers are unequal in front of improved
profiling: although many consumers may lose (and would thus be willing to
protect their privacy), some other consumers may win; it may even be the
case that the winners would benefit sufficiently so that they could compensate
the losers, i.e., consumers as a group would welcome improved profiling.
In the rest of this section, we focus on the case perfectly correlated profil-
ing technologies, i.e., we assume that φ = 1/λ, so that a = 1 and b = β. We
also assume that firm B is able to profile consumers (β > 0) but not as well as
firm A (β < 1, profiling technologies are asymmetric), so that Lemma 2 does
not apply. Under these assumptions, any consumer that firm B (the ‘less-
informed’ firm) profiles is also profiled by firm A (the ‘better-informed’ firm),
meaning that the B-translucent segment is empty (MB = βλ(1 − φλ) = 0).
This greatly simplifies the analysis and allows us to fully characterize the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, perform comparative statics exercises,
and draw insightful results about the sensitivity of consumer surplus and the
demand for privacy.
23See Executive Office of the President of the United States (2015).
24Writing down the consumer surplus supposes being able to complete the following
list of tasks. First, for each consumer with value r, we need to obtain the (expected)
prices that she is likely to face, taking into account that she will face (i) the minimum
of the two (potentially random) uniform prices if she is not profiled by any firm, (ii)
the minimum of both firms’ random personalized prices if she is profiled by both firms,
or (iii) the minimum of firm A’s random personalized price and firm B’s (potentially
random) uniform price if she is profiled only by firm B (and inversely if she is only profiled
by firm B). Second, for each minimum of prices, we need to calculate the densities of
these minimum prices and the corresponding surplus to this consumer. Third, we need to
integrate over all prices to obtain the expected surplus of this consumer. Finally, we need
to integrate over all consumers to get the total consumer surplus. One understands that
these operations are complex to perform, even in the case of simple distributions such
as the uniform distribution. Moreover, performing comparative static exercises would add
another layer of complexity.
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5.1 Equilibrium characterization and comparative stat-
ics
Developing Propositions 1 and 2 for the case under review, we obtain the
following characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibrium (the proof and
the exact formulation of some functions are relegated to Appendix 7.2).
Proposition 3. If profiling technologies are perfectly correlated, there exists
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium such that: (1) At the first stage, firms
choose their uniform price according to the following strategies. Firm A draws
pA from the distribution HA (p) with probability ∇A, or sets pA = pm with
probability 1 − ∇A. Firm B draws pB from the distribution HB (p) with
probability ∇B, or sets pB = r¯ with probability 1 − ∇B. The distributions
HA (p) and HB (p) are defined on the interval [pl, p
m). If Condition (6) is
met, then ∇A = ∇B = 0 and the pair (pA, pB) = (pm, r¯) is an equilibrium
in pure strategies.(2) At the second stage, if pB = 0, then (pA (x) , pB (x)) =
(0, 0) is the unique equilibrium; if pB > 0, firm B draws pB(x) from the





for p ∈ [(1− β)pxB, pxB] ,
0 otherwise,
and pxB ≡ min {pB, r (x)}; firm A does so as well with probability β, and sets
pA(x) = p
x
B with probability 1− β.
Our objective is now to understand how the equilibrium prices depend, for
any log concave demand function, on two key parameters of the model: the
measure of firms’ abilities to profile consumers (λ) and the level of asymmetry
between the two profiling technologies (β).
Improved profiling. How do firms modify their pricing behavior when
their ability to profile consumers improves, i.e., when λ increases? Recall
that we assume that the profiling technologies of the two firms are perfectly
correlated, with respective abilities to profile consumers λA = λ and λB = βλ.
Hence, an increase in λ makes it easier for both firms to profile consumers.
The following corollary summarizes the answer to this question.25
Corollary 1. An improved ability to profile consumers increases the uniform
prices in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, and it does not affect
the distribution of personalized prices. Hence, an increase in λ leads to higher
uniform and personalized prices.
25The proofs of all comparative statics results can be found in Appendix 7.2.2.
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It is clear from Proposition 3 that for a given uniform price of firm B, pB,
the distribution of personalized prices is independent of λ. However, increas-
ing λ has three effects on the uniform prices. First, it increases the lowest
possible uniform price charged by both firm A and firm B, i.e. ∂pl/∂λ > 0.
Second, it increases the probability that both firms charge their respective
highest uniform price, i.e. ∂∇A/∂λ < 0 and ∂∇B/∂λ < 0. Finally, they
tend to charge higher prices when they randomize their uniform prices, i.e.
∂HA(p)/∂λ < 0 and ∂HB(p)/∂λ < 0. In sum, all three effects push the distri-
butions of uniform prices to the right. Since λ has no effect on the distribution
of equilibrium personalized prices, we can be sure that an improved ability to
profile consumers leads, ceteris paribus, to higher prices. Intuitively, when
profiling is improved, it is more likely that firms will be competing in the
transparent segment, which relaxes competition in the opaque segment and
thus raises uniform prices.
More symmetric profiling technologies. Let us now consider the effect
on the pricing behavior of both firms of increasing the symmetry between the
profiling technologies (measured by the parameter β). It would seem logical
to expect that as the profiling technologies become more similar, competition
between the two firms would get more intense and prices would go down.
However, things are not as simple here, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The uniform prices are at their highest level in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance when the level of asymmetry is intermediate
(i.e., β = 1/2).
As above, we can show that the lower bound of the uniform price distri-
bution, the probability of firms charging the highest uniform price, and the
probability of firms charging higher uniform prices when they randomize their
uniform prices are at their highest level when β = 1/2. This implies that more
symmetry increases the uniform prices when firms’ detection technologies are
very different, but decreases the uniform prices when firms’ technologies are
slightly different. There is thus an intermediate level of asymmetry, β = 1/2,
that maximizes the profits of the two firms.
Another effect of increasing β is to push personalized prices down for
given uniform prices. This is due to the more intense competition between
firms on the transparent segment.26
Corollary 3. For given uniform prices, the personalized prices decrease with
the symmetry between firms in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
26However, this result ignores the indirect effect a higher level of symmetry has on
personalized prices through the effect it has on uniform prices. The expected uniform
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In Appendix 7.2, we illustrate the previous comparative statics results
with the case of a uniform distribution of the consumer valuations.
5.2 Do consumers necessarily suffer from improved pro-
filing?
To answer this question formally, we decompose the effects that improved
profiling may have on different categories of consumers. We know from Corol-
lary 1 that an increase in λ decreases the probability that either firm will
charge any uniform price below some price p. This unequivocally implies that
all prices go up. It may then seem natural to conclude that the consumer
surplus goes down. But there is a twist: the impact of these higher prices
is only clear for consumers whose status does not change, i.e., those who
remain anonymous (who face higher uniform prices) and those who remain
profiled (who face higher personalized prices). Yet, the impact on consumers
who switch status remains unclear. Improved profiling indeed means that
some consumers who used to be anonymous are now profiled. Among them,
consumers with a low valuation will start purchasing (which they did not
do when they were anonymous), and will thus enjoy a larger surplus; con-
sumers with a larger valuation, who continue to purchase, may also benefit if
they are now charged a lower personalized price than the uniform price they
were paying before. As the following example shows, the positive impact on
‘switchers’ may be sufficiently important to outweigh the negative impact
on ‘non switchers’, so that improved profiling ends up increasing consumer
surplus on aggregate.
In Appendix 7.2, we compute the consumer surplus in the case of a uni-
form distribution of consumer valuations; we show that it is an increasing
function of λ in this particular case. To understand this result, let us divide
the group of ‘switchers’ into three subgroups. We have first the ‘Low value
switchers’ (group L), who did not purchase before precision improved; then
we have the ‘Middle value switchers’ (group M), who would have purchased
at the monopoly price but have now access, with higher precision, to a lower
price (in expectation); finally, we have the ‘High value switchers’ (group H),
who would have purchased at the monopoly price but are now faced with a
price is:
EpB = (1−∇B)r¯ +∇B
∫ pm
pl








We can show that ∂EpB/∂β > 0 when β < 1/2, which means that the expected highest
personalized prices are maximized when β = 1/2.
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targeted price that is higher than the monopoly price in expectations (these
consumers would prefer to ‘hide’). In the present example, the benefits to
groups L and M (a market expansion effect) outweigh the losses for group
H (a price discrimination effect). Moreover, the benefits for switchers with
low and middle valuations also outweigh the losses for all consumers who do
not switch status.
But if consumers as a group benefit, does it necessarily imply that firms
will have lower profits? The answers is no. In fact, in the above example
(see Appendix 7.2 for the details), firm A’s profit remain constant, while
firm B’s profit increases when λ increases. Hence, the market expansion
effect dominates for firms as well. This is no surprise for firm B, since it
only obtains positive profits on the transparent segment and prices in the
transparent segment are not affected by an increase in λ. For firm A the loss
of profits on the opaque segment is just compensated by the gain in profits
in the transparent and translucent segments. Hence, somewhat surprisingly,
while consumers as a group are better off on average, this does not happen at
the expense of the firms’ profits. To the contrary, consumers (as a group) and
firms (as a group) strictly benefit from higher precision. This is due to the
market expansion effect and the corresponding reduction in the deadweight
loss.
We can also study how consumers are affected when only the profiling
technology of the less-informed firm improves (i.e., when β increases). In
this case, we see from Corollary 3 that the impact depends of where we
start from. For relatively high levels of symmetry between firms’ profiling
technologies (β > 1/2), increasing further the symmetry benefits consumers
as it leads to both lower uniform prices and lower personalized prices. In
contrast, for relatively low levels of symmetry (β < 1/2), increasing the
symmetry leads to higher uniform prices but lower personalized prices.
5.3 Exogenous and endogenous privacy
So far, we have assumed that it is not possible for consumers to escape
being identified by the firms when profiling technologies are effective. In
reality, consumers may resort to obfuscation strategies that make profiling
technologies inoperative; for instance, consumers may delete cookies, use
tools to browse the web anonymously, or purchase ad blockers. Although a
full analysis of this possibility goes beyond the scope of this paper, we can
discuss under which conditions consumers may wish to ‘hide’ themselves.27
27To analyze the full implications of endogenous privacy choices by consumers, we would
first need to assess the interplay between consumers’ hiding behavior and firms’ pricing
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As we explained in Section 3, firm B may, when the opaque segment is
relatively small, have an incentive to focus only on consumers it can profile,
by charging the choking price of demand as its uniform price, while firm
A charges the monopoly price as its uniform price. This pushes up prices
on the transparent segment, leading in some cases to a situation in which
all personalized prices lie above the monopoly price (charged to consumers
that a firm does not profile). In this case, some of these consumers would
prefer to hide, as they will face lower prices in the opaque segment. We saw in
Corollary 1 that this situation becomes more likely the higher the precision of
the detection technology. This implies that the less privacy regulation there
is (the higher λ), the more it will lead to a demand for (endogenous) privacy.
As a consequence, better privacy regulation (lower λ) would tend to push
prices down, increasing consumer surplus, and lower the need for consumers
to hide. We conclude that the fear for consumers to face higher prices when
they are ‘in the open’ rather than ‘in the dark’ does not disappear when it
is not just one but several competing firms that have the ability to profile
consumers.
5.4 What if uniform prices are made public?
We now study the consequences of having ‘observable’ uniform prices. We
have in mind what is commonly known as list prices, i.e., (uniform) prices
that any consumer can observe and can thus claim to buy at. The immediate
consequence of the presence of such prices is that firms now face an upper
bound on the personalized prices they can charge to the consumers they pro-
file. Hence, a firm does not just compete against the prices of its competitor
but also against its own uniform price. We expect that this would lead to
more competition and lower prices in equilibrium. We provide two results
that allow us to confirm this conjecture.
First, it is immediate that setting all prices equal to marginal cost is now
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. In contrast to the case where
consumers only receive one price from each firm, no firm has an incentive
to increase its uniform price at stage 1, as all consumers (profiled or not)
always keep the possibility to purchase at the lowest listed uniform price.
We conclude that the observability of uniform prices restores the Bertrand
Paradox even when firms have asymmetric profiling technologies.
strategies; we could then characterize an equilibrium with endogenous hiding, and study
the effect of consumer hiding on firms’ profits and consumer surplus. We leave this for
future research.
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Proposition 4. If all consumers can purchase a good at the (observed) uni-
form price, then marginal cost pricing is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of the pricing game.
What remains to be shown, however, is whether this is the only equilib-
rium. Our second result gives an indicative answer. We show in the following
example that, in a simplified version of our model where consumers can have
valuations of only two types, high and low, no other equilibrium can exist.
Example: A model with two types of consumers.
Assume that there is a unit mass of consumers and that any consumer
x can be one of two types: their valuation for the homogeneous product is
either high, r(x) = 1, with probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1) or low, r(x) = ζ < 1, with
probability 1 − ϕ. Assume further that if the market was served by a (non
discriminating) monopolist, this firm would set a uniform price equal to ζ
and so, serve the whole market; this happens when ϕ < ζ. In this setting,
we can show (see Appendix 7.3) that there cannot exist a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the game with the features described in Proposition 3




in which firm A draws
pA according to the distribution HA (p) with probability ∇A, or sets pA = ζ
with probability 1−∇A, and in which firm B draws pB from the distribution
HB (p) with probability ∇B, or sets pB = ζ with probability 1−∇B).
Given the previous two findings, there are good reasons to believe that
list prices exert downward pressure on equilibrium prices in our model.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
We have examined price competition in a homogenous goods setting in which
firms can imperfectly profile consumers. When they do, they can charge these
consumers a personalized price, but firms (potentially) differ in their ability
to profile. This asymmetry between the firms’ profiling technologies leads
to uncertainty about the nature of price competition and, thereby, generates
market power. The necessary ingredients for this result are price competi-
tion and ‘imperfect consumer profiling’, which refers to the idea that firms
are able to identify consumers’ valuations for the product but only in an
imperfect way. The profiling of consumers enables price discrimination, but
its imperfect nature makes firms uncertain about the competitor’s pricing
strategy, which triggers strategic random pricing. In sum, as long as both
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firms can track consumers, asymmetric and/or imperfectly correlated profil-
ing technologies can generate a way out of the Bertrand paradox. Our results
also imply that when only one firm can profile consumers, it does not manage
to obtain any market power.
Our analysis allows us to draw the following policy implications. First,
it is not clear a priori how consumers are affected by changes in privacy rules.
We show indeed that modifying these rules, and thereby affecting firms’ abil-
ity to practice differential pricing, have an ambiguous impact on consumers.
Take, for instance, the impact of less protective rules: on the one hand, some
consumers will pay higher prices because firms can profile them more easily;
but on the other hand, some consumers who used to be anonymous will now
be profiled and among them, those with a low valuation will start purchas-
ing and will thus enjoy a larger surplus; we even show the possibility that
the positive impact on the latter consumers may be sufficiently important to
outweigh the negative impact on the former ones, so that improved profiling
ends up increasing consumer surplus on aggregate. The complex interplay
between these countervailing forces may explain why the United States and
the European Union have recently taken contrasting decisions regarding the
protection of consumers privacy.28
Although we suggest that the effects of strengthening or relaxing privacy
protection are hard to ascertain, we are confident that all consumers should
be better off if firms had the obligation to make their uniform prices public.
With such observable uniform prices, firms would face an upper bound on
the personalized prices they can charge to the consumers they profile, which
is likely to drive prices down (possibly back to marginal costs).
Second, our results shed new light on the working of markets for data,
which is also a heavily debated topic. Currently, the focus is essentially
on the supply side of data, with concerns about potential barriers to entry
stemming from the presence of economies of scale and/or of scope at the suc-
cessive stages of the ‘data value chain’ (i.e., collection, storage, analysis, and
usage).29 Yet, conduct and strategies on the supply side of the markets for
28In the U.S., recent regulatory changes contribute to make customer data even more
widely available to firms. In October 2016, the US Federal Communications Commis-
sion, then under Democratic majority, imposed a set of privacy rules on Internet service
providers, requiring them to get opt-in consent from consumers before using, sharing, or
selling their Web browsing data, app usage history and other private information. Yet,
on April 3 2017, President Donald Trump signed a repeal of these rules, following actions
taken by both houses of the US Congress (see, e.g., Brodkin (2017)). As for the E.U., it
adopted in April 2016 the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is meant
to strengthen and unify data protection for all individuals within the EU; this regulation
will become directly applicable in all Member States from 25 May 2018.
29See, e.g., Rubinfeld and Gal (2017) and Duch-Brown et al. (2017).
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data cannot be properly analyzed without a good understanding of the de-
mand side of these markets. In this respect, our contribution is to show that
firms’ willingness to pay for data (for price discrimination purposes) heavily
depends on the profiling ability that this data confers and, more importantly,
on what kind of customer analytics can be accessed by competitors. As a con-
sequence, data owners/brokers have incentives to provide several firms with
data as long as firms end up with different abilities to profile consumers; that
is, some form of ‘vertical data differentiation’ arises. Regarding the regula-
tion of markets for data, we note that exclusivity contracts offered by data
brokers do not necessarily harm consumers. Indeed, in our model exclusivity
leads to more—rather than less—competition.
In terms of empirical implications, we establish that when there is
uncertainty regarding the nature of price competition, firms may randomize
both their uniform and personalized prices. Then, there may be three si-
multaneous explanations as to why two consumers end up paying different
prices: firms may charge them either different personalized prizes (price dis-
crimination), or randomized uniform prices (price dispersion), or randomized
personalized prices (price discrimination and dispersion).30 This provides a
justification to the ‘Amazon story’. In September 2000, a customer of Ama-
zon.com accused Amazon of price discrimination (a.k.a. differential pricing):
this customer realized that after having deleted the cookie that identified him
as a regular Amazon customer, he was offered some DVD for a much lower
price than the one he observed the first time he visited the web site. The
company later apologized and explained that the price difference was not the
result of differential pricing but of random price testing.31 Our results sug-
gest that both Amazon and its customer may have been right. Meanwhile, a
recent report by Bourreau et al. (2017) shows that although there is a lack
of evidence of price discrimination, a large volatility of prices is observed. A
related implication of our results is that the absence of direct observation of
price discrimination should not be taken as proof that such a pricing tactic
is not practiced, as it cannot be distinguished from price dispersion in some
30Our paper establishes thus a novel source of price dispersion. In the existing literature,
price dispersion is attributed, for example, to search costs on the buyer’s side (Varian
(1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983), strategic advertising (Ireland (1993)), differences in
the cost structure on the seller’s side (Spulber (1995)), uncertainty about the number of
active firms on the market (Janssen and Rasmusen (2002)), firms adding complexity to
their price structures (Carlin (2009)), or uniform price constraints on the seller (Gautier
and Wauthy (2010)). In most of these papers, price dispersion arises in equilibrium due to
the uncertainty about the intensity of competition in the market. Our analysis, however,
emphasizes that it is the uncertainty about the nature of competition that may generate
market power and price dispersion of both uniform and personalized prices.
31See Ramasastry (2005).
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cases. In particular, when the nature of price competition is uncertain, it
would be useful to account for all sources of price variations empirically, not
just some of them.
References
Acquisti, A., C. Taylor, and L. Wagman (2016). The economics of privacy.
Journal of Economic Literature 54 (2), 442–92.
Belleflamme, P. and W. Vergote (2016). Monopoly price discrimination and
privacy: The hidden cost of hiding. Economics Letters 149, 141–144.
BenMark, G., S. Klapdor, M. Kullmann, and R. Sundararajan (2017). How
retailers can drive profitable growth through dynamic pricing. McKinsey
& Company (March). http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-
insights/how-retailers-can-drive-profitable-growth-through-dynamic-
pricing.
Bourreau, M., A. de Streel, and I. Graef (2017). Big data and competition
policy: Market power, personalised pricing and advertising. CERRE Final
Report .
Braulin, F. C. and T. Valletti (2016). Selling customer information to com-
peting firms. Economics Letters 149, 10–14.
Brodkin, J. (2017). President trump delivers final blow to web browsing
privacy rules. Ars Technica (April 4). https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/04/trumps-signature-makes-it-official-isp-privacy-rules-are-
dead/.
Burdett, K. and K. L. Judd (1983). Equilibrium price dispersion. Economet-
rica 51 (4), 955–969.
Business Wire (2015). Ant financial unveils China’s first credit-
scoring system using online data. Business Wire (January 27).
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150127006582/en/
Ant-Financial-Unveils-China{2019}s-Credit-Scoring-System-Online.
Calzolari, G. and A. Pavan (2006). On the optimality of privacy in sequential
contracting. Journal of Economic theory 130 (1), 168–204.
Carlin, B. I. (2009). Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets.
Journal of financial Economics 91 (3), 278–287.
30
Chen, Y. and G. Iyer (2002). Consumer addressability and customized pric-
ing. Marketing Science 21 (2), 197–208.
Choe, C., S. King, and N. Matsushima (2018). Pricing with cookies:
Behavior-based price discrimination and spatial competition. Management
Science 64 (12), 5669–5687.
Corts, K. S. (1998). Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly: all-out
competition and strategic commitment. RAND Journal of Economics ,
306–323.
Duch-Brown, N., B. Martens, and F. Mueller-Langer (2017).
The economics of ownership, access and trade in digi-
tal data. JRC Digital Economy Working Paper 2017-01.
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc104756.pdf.
Encaoua, D. and A. Hollander (2007). First-degree discrimination by a
duopoly: pricing and quality choice. The BE Journal of Theoretical Eco-
nomics 7 (1), Article 14.
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2019). Big
data analytics in motor and health insurance: A thematic review.
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/EIOPA_BigDataAnalytics_
ThematicReview_April2019.pdf.
Executive Office of the President of the United States (2015). Big data and
differential pricing. Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, D.C.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf.
Feld, S., H. Frenzen, M. Krafft, K. Peters, and P. C. Verhoef (2013). The
effects of mailing design characteristics on direct mail campaign perfor-
mance. International Journal of Research in Marketing 30 (2), 143–159.
Gautier, A. and X. Wauthy (2010). Price competition under universal service
obligations. International Journal of Economic Theory 6 (3), 311–326.
Ireland, N. J. (1993). The provision of information in a Bertrand oligopoly.
Journal of Industrial Economics , 61–76.
Iyer, G., D. Soberman, and J. M. Villas-Boas (2005). The targeting of ad-
vertising. Marketing Science 24 (3), 461–476.
Janssen, M. and E. Rasmusen (2002). Bertrand competition under uncer-
tainty. Journal of Industrial Economics 50 (1), 11–21.
31
Jentzsch, N., G. Sapi, and I. Suleymanova (2013). Targeted pricing and
customer data sharing among rivals. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 31 (2), 131–144.
Kehoe, P. J., B. J. Larsen, and E. Pastorino (2018). Dynamic competition in
the era of big data. Technical report, Working paper, Stanford University
and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Kim, J.-H., L. Wagman, and A. L. Wickelgren (2019). The impact of access
to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and
exclusive dealing. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 28 (3),
373–391.
Liu, Q. and K. Serfes (2004). Quality of information and oligopolistic price
discrimination. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 13 (4), 671–
702.
McKinsey&Company (2016). The age of analytics: Competing in
a data-driven world. McKinsey Global Institute (December).
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-
insights/the-age-of-analytics-competing-in-a-data-driven-world.
Mikians, J., L. Gyarmati, V. Erramilli, and N. Laoutaris (2012). Detecting
price and search discrimination on the internet. In Proceedings of the 11th
ACM workshop on hot topics in networks, pp. 79–84.
Montes, R., W. Sand-Zantman, and T. Valletti (2019). The value of personal
information in online markets with endogenous privacy. Management Sci-
ence 65 (3), 1342–1362.
Newman, N. (2013). The costs of lost privacy: Consumer harm and rising
economic inequality in the age of Google. William Mitchell Law Review 40,
849.
Quito, A. and A. Shendruk (2019). US hospitals are now required by
law to post prices online. Good luck finding them. Quartz (January
15). https://qz.com/1518545/price-lists-for-the-115-biggest-us-hospitals-
new-transparency-law/.
Ramasastry, A. (2005). Web sites change prices
based on customers’ habits. CNN.com (June 24).
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/.
32
Rubinfeld, D. L. and M. S. Gal (2017). Access barriers to big data. Arizona
Law Review 59, 339.
Shaffer, G. and Z. J. Zhang (2002). Competitive one-to-one promotions.
Management Science 48 (9), 1143–1160.
Shiller, B. (2014). First-degree price discrimination using big data. Working
Paper 58, Brandeis University.
Spulber, D. F. (1995). Bertrand competition when rivals’ costs are unknown.
Journal of Industrial Economics , 1–11.
Taylor, C. and L. Wagman (2014). Consumer privacy in oligopolistic mar-
kets: Winners, losers, and welfare. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 34, 80–84.
Thisse, J.-F. and X. Vives (1988). On the strategic choice of spatial price
policy. American Economic Review , 122–137.
Valletti, T. and J. Wu (2016). ‘Big Data’ vs ‘Small Data’: Consumer profiling
with data requirements. Technical report, Mimeo.
Varian, H. R. (1980). A model of sales. American Economic Review 70 (4),
651–659.
Villas-Boas, J. M. (1999). Dynamic competition with customer recognition.
Rand Journal of Economics , 604–631.
Wattal, S., R. Telang, T. Mukhopadhyay, and P. Boatwright (2012). What’s
in a “name”? Impact of use of customer information in e-mail advertise-
ments. Information Systems Research 23 (3), 679–697.
33
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of this proposition is divided in 3 steps. In Step 1 we show under which
conditions on the parameters there exists a pure strategy equilibrium and characterize
that Nash equilibrium. In Step 2 we characterize the unique mixed strategy equilibrium
when (1− a)pxA < (1− b)pxB and determine the expected payoff for each firm. Finally, in
step 3, we show that when (1− a)pxA = (1− b)pxB two mixed strategy equilibria exist with
an expected payoff for each firm equal to (1 − a)pxA = (1 − b)pxB . We therefore say that
the mixed strategy equilibrium is essentially unique.
Remark: The reader will note that our proof of steps 1 and 2 is done for the case when
(1 − a)pxA < (1 − b)pxB and that the construction of the mixed strategy equilibrium does
not depend on our assumption that a > b. In other words the equilibrium we constructed
does not depend on the identity of the firm A or B: If (1− a)pxA > (1− b)pxB we can just
obtain an equivalent proposition by interchanging pA and pB . We will make use of this in
Step 3 to characterize the mixed strategy equilibria when (1− a)pxA = (1− b)pxB .
Step I. Pure vs Mixed strategy equilibria
To guide the reader we illustrate the ranges for which there exists a pure strategy or
mixed strategy equilibrium in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Mixed vs Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Case I. When pxA < (1− b)pxB we need to distinguish two cases:
1. No pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists when pxA < ap
x
B .
2. There is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when apxB ≤ pxA ≤ (1 − b)pxB . In this





Case II. No pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists when pxA ≥ (1− b)pxB.
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Proof. Proof of Lemma 3.
Case I. When pxA < (1− b)pxB .
Firm A knows it can lure consumer x into buying as long as pA(x) ≤ pxB . Firm A will
thus never charge a targeted price, pA(x), below (1− b)pxB since this is the expected payoff
from charging pA(x) = p
x
B . Nor does it make sense to sell at a price above the consumer’s
willingness to pay: pA(x) ≤ r(x).Now suppose that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
in which firm A charges pA(x) such that (1− b)pxB ≤ pA(x) ≤ r(x). What is firm B’s best
response when she recognizes consumer x? Firm B can either try to obtain the consumer
x with probability 1 by charging pB(x) ≤ pxA or set at a higher price and sell to the
consumer with probability a by just undercutting pA(x). The first strategy yields profit
pxA while the second yields profit apA(x). When apA(x) ≤ pxA firm B’s best response is
to play pB(x) = p
x
A, when apA(x) > p
x
A firm B does not have a best response (wants to
just undercut firm A, but because prices are chosen from a continuum, there is no best
response). So in any pure strategy equilibrium it must be that pB(x) = p
x
A, but then the
best response of firm A is to set pA(x) = p
x





be a pure strategy equilibrium it must be that apxB ≤ pxA. We also have that pxA ≤ (1−b)pxB ,
so a pure strategy Nash equilibrium can only occur when if a ≤ 1 − b. This is ruled out
when a + b > 1. In this pure strategy equilibrium firm A’s expected payoff is (1 − b)pxB
while firm B’s expected payoff is pxA.
Case II. Mixed strategy Personalized pricing when pxA ≥ (1− b)pxB .
Proof. We follow the same reasoning as Case 1. Again, firm A will never set pA(x) <
(1− b)pxB or pA(x) > r(x). Suppose that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which
firm A charges pA(x) such that r(x) ≥ pA(x) ≥ (1− b)pxB . What is firm B’s best response
when she recognizes consumer x?
First let pA(x) ≥ pxA. Then firm B can either sell to consumer x with probability 1 by
charging pB(x) ≤ pxA or set a higher price and sell to the consumer with probability a by
just undercutting pA(x). The first strategy yields profit p
x
A while the second yields profit
apA(x). Hence when apA(x) ≤ pxA firm B’s best response is to play pB(x) = pxA, and when
apA(x) > p
x
A firm B does not have a best response. So in any pure strategy equilibrium it
must be that pB(x) = p
x
A. Then the best response of firm A would be to set pA(x) = p
x
B
or to slightly undercut pB(x) = p
x
A. Firm A will choose pA(x) = p
x
B when (1− b)pxB > pxA.
This is a contradiction since we assumed that pxA ≥ (1− b)pxB.
Now let pA(x) < p
x
A. Then firm B can either try to sell to consumer x with probability 1
by charging pB(x) < pA(x) or set a higher price and sell to the consumer with probability
1− a by charging pxA. The first strategy yields a profit arbitrarily close to pA(x) while the
second yields profit (1 − a)pxA. Hence when pA(x) ≤ (1 − a)pxA firm B’s best response is
to play pB(x) = p
x
A, and when pA(x) ≥ (1 − a)pxA firm B does not have a best response.
So in any pure strategy equilibrium it must be that pB(x) = p
x
A > pA(x). But then firm
A has an incentive to increase the targeted price anywhere between (pA(x), p
x
A). As a
consequence there cannot be any pure strategy equilibrium.
Step II. Characterizing the mixed strategy Nash equilibria
We now characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium and obtain expected payoffs for
each firm in equilibrium. We first introduce a series of useful results that will help us
construct the equilibrium strategies. We emphasize that none of the arguments we make
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to characterize the equilibrium strategies depends on our assumption that firm A is better
at recognizing consumers than firm (a ≥ b). We will focus on finding the mixed strategy
equilibria when (1 − a)pxA ≤ (1 − b)pxB , but by doing so we also characterize the mixed
strategy Nash equilibria when (1− a)pxA ≥ (1− b)pxB .
Lemma 4. Assume that (1− a)pxA < (1− b)pxB.
• Then Firm A will never set a price below (1− b)pxB in equilibrium and can always
guarantee herself an expected payoff of (1− b)pxB.
• For firm B we have:
– If pxA ≤ a(1−b)pxB firm B will never set a price below (1−b)pxB in equilibrium
and can always guarantee herself an expected payoff of a(1− b)pxB.
– If a(1 − b)pxB ≤ pxA ≤ (1 − b)pxB firm B will never set a price below pxA in
equilibrium and can always guarantee herself an expected payoff of pxA.
– If pxA ≥ (1− b)pxB firm B will never set a price below (1− b)pxB in equilibrium
and can always guarantee herself an expected payoff of (1− b)pxB.
Proof. Proof. The result for firm A follows from the proof of lemma 3 above. The same
logic yields the result for firm B.
Lemma 5. Let p
i
(x) be the infimum of all the equilibrium prices charged to consumer x




(x) = p(x) then no firm attaches positive probability to
p(x).
Proof. Suppose firm i attaches positive probability to p(x). Now consider a targeted price
pj(x) for firm j arbitrarily close to p(x) then firm j can deviate (and increase her payoff)
by slightly undercutting p(x), as she will add a strictly positive mass of sales (that she
‘stole’ from firm i).
We conclude from lemma 5 that if one firm plays the lowest price with positive prob-
ability then the other firm’s lowest price must be strictly higher. We now determine the
upper bound on prices in any equilibrium. This will allow us to pin down expected profits
in any equilibrium.
Lemma 6. Let pi(x) be the supremum of all the equilibrium prices charged to consumer
x by firm i = A,B. Let p(x) = max{pA(x), pB(x)}. When (1 − a)pxA < (1 − b)pxB, then
pB(x) ≤ pA(x) = p(x) = pxB.
Proof. Proof. We first show that p(x) ≤ pxB . Suppose not, then either pA(x) > pxB or
pB(x) > p
x
B , or both.
Suppose first that pA(x) > p
x
B . Since A will not sell to consumers it does not recognize
it must be the case that firm B sets prices equal to or higher than pA(x) with positive
probability: pB(x) ≥ pA(x). Firm B will only be willing to do so if pB(x) ≤ pxA . By
lemma 4, firm B can guarantee a payoff of (1 − b)pxB . By playing pB(x) firm B obtains
strictly less, a contradiction:
(1− a)pB(x) ≤ (1− a)pxA < (1− b)pxB .
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Now suppose that pB(x) > p(x) ≥ pA(x). Again it must be that pB(x) ≤ pxA, otherwise
firm B would obtain zero expected profit from setting its price equal (or close) to its
supremum pB(x). We obtain the same contradiction:
(1− a)pB(x) ≤ (1− a)pxA < (1− b)pxB .
We now show that p(x) ≥ pxB . First note that one cannot have that pB(x) < pA(x) <
pxB since otherwise firm A can increase profits by setting pA(x) = p
x
B . Then suppose that
pA(x) ≤ pB(x) < pxB . In order for firm A to obtain profits equal to (1 − b)pxB , firm B
must assign positive mass to prices from the set [pA(x), p
x
B ] and pB(x) ≤ pxA. This would
imply that if pA(x) < p
x
B firm B will only play pB(x) from this interval. But then firm A
can just increase her price slightly above pA(x), not lose any customers and increase her
expected profit. Hence the only possibility left is pB(x) = pA(x) < p
x
B . Then B must play
pB(x) with positive probability so that firm A can guarantee herself a payoff of (1− b)pxB
while firm A attaches zero probability to it. But then firm B will only be willing to do
so if pB(x) = pA(x) ≤ pxA. By lemma 4, firm B can guarantee a payoff of (1 − b)pxB . By
playing pB(x) firm B obtains strictly less, a contradiction.
Lemma 7. Let p¯(x) be the supremum of all the equilibrium prices charged to consumer x
by either firm. It cannot be that both firms play this price with positive probability.
Proof. This follows from the fact that both firms would have an incentive to slightly
undercut the other.
Lemma 8. When (1−a)pxA < (1−b)pxB, the expected payoff for firm A in any equilibrium
is (1− b)pxB.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that equilibrium prices cannot be above
pxB and that firm A is guaranteed a payoff of (1 − b)pxB . To have a higher expected
payoff, firm B should play pxB with positive probability. The payoff of firm B is then
(1 − a)pxB < (1 − b)pxB if pxB ≤ pxA. But in this case firm B can guarantee herself an
expected profit of (1− b)pxB , a contradiction. If on the other hand pxB > pxA, firm B makes
zero profits from playing pxB .
We are now ready to fully characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium. We need to
consider several different cases.
Step II Case 1. pxA < a(1− b)pxB
Figure 2: Step II case 1
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This case is illustrated in Figure 2. In this case firm B, like firm A, will not set a price
below (1 − b)pxB . They must set the same lowest price and this price cannot be a mass
point of the price distribution of any firm (see Lemma 5). If one firm were to have a lowest
price which is higher than the one of the other firm, then the latter has an incentive to
deviate and increase her lowest price since it will not change her probability of selling to
the consumer while at the same time it increases her sales price.
Let F 1B(p) be the probability distribution of prices of firm B in equilibrium in case 1.
For firm A the following must hold:
1. For any price pA(x) firm A must get an expected payoff of (1− b)pxB . Then firm A
must have a probability of selling equal to one when charging pA(x) = (1− b)pxB .
2. For any other price p: (1− b)p+ b(1− F 1B(p)p = (1− b)pxB .
3. It follows that
F 1B(p) = 1−
(1− b)(pxB − p)
bp
.
Let F 1A(p) be the probability distribution of prices of firm A in equilibrium in case 1.
For firm B the following must hold:
1. For any price pB(x) charged firm B must get an expected payoff of a(1−b)pxB . Thus
firm B must have a probability of selling equal to a when charging pB(x) = (1−b)pxB .
2. For any other price p: a(1− FA(p))p = a(1− b)pxB ,








We conclude that firm A must play pA(x) = p
x
B with probability 1− b.
In summary, we obtain:











Step II Case 2. a(1− b)pxB < pxA < (1− b)pxB
This case is illustrated in Figure 3. If pxA ≥ apxB then there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium, as argued above. We characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium in the event
that pxA < ap
x
B . Again we will use the fact that firm A must have an expected payoff in any
equilibrium equal to (1 − b)pxB in order to pin down the (unique) equilibrium strategies.
Let F 2i (p) be the probability distribution of prices of firm i = A,B in equilibrium in case
2. We first state the equilibrium strategies after which we develop the proof:








Figure 3: Step II case 2
– She plays pxB with probability ΨA =
pxA
apxB




































Since firm A obtains expected profit equal to (1 − b)pxB in any equilibrium, firm A
will not set a price below (1− b)pxB while the supremum of its equilibrium prices is pxB in
any mixed strategy equilibrium. Now imagine that firm A and firm B would charge prices
equal to or slightly above (1− b)pxB in equilibrium. For firm B this would mean that she
would obtain an expected payoff of approximately a(1− b)pxB . Then firm B would have a
profitable deviation by lowering her price to pxA and obtain p
x
A > a(1−b)pxB . Indeed, she is
better off selling to customer with probability 1 by charging pxA than selling to only those
consumers that firm A also recognizes (with probability a) as this yields a(1− b)pxB ≤ pxA.
But if firm B will not charge prices in neighborhood of (1 − b)pxB , firm A will not play
these prices as she can simply increase her price, not lose any consumers and increase her
expected payoff. In other words, (1− b)pxB cannot be the lowest price that firm A charges
in equilbrium. What then will this lowest price, p
A
(x), be? Following the above logic, the
lowest price firm A charges in equilibrium, p
A
(x), must make firm B indifferent between
obtaining the consumer for sure and charging p
A




Since firm A must be playing a mixed strategy it must be indifferent between the
(infimum of the) lowest price it charges, p
A
(x), and the (supremum of the) highest price
it charges, pA(x) = p
x
B . On the other hand firm B is also playing a mixed strategy and
should be indifferent between playing pxA and any other equilibrium price pB(x) price. But
then the lowest price firm B is willing to charge above pxA, call it pB(x), must guarantee
her a payoff of pxA. This is the case when apB(x) = p
x





a . It then follows that pB(x) = pA(x) =
pxA
a .






B it must be that firm B charges
































































= 1b − (1−b)b = 1. Firm
B must also be indifferent between any price it charges given the mixed strategy chosen by















it must be that
a(1− F 2A(p))p = pxA,




This must imply that firm A plays pA(x) = p
x
B with positive probability ΨA equal to








Step II Case 3. pxA ≥ (1− b)pxB
This last case is illustrated in Figure 4:
Figure 4: Step II case 3
We need to consider two subcases:








Step II Case 3i Let F 3ij (p) be the probability distribution of prices of firm j = A,B
in case 3i in equilibrium in case 3i. When (1 − b)pxB ≤ pxA < (1−b)p
x
B
2−a−b we will prove the
following:
• Firm B mixes its price pB(x) according to the distribution function F 3iB (p) over the
support:
[(1− b)pxB , pxA] ∪ [p˜(x), pxB)




• Firm A mixes its price pA(x) according to the distribution function F 3iA (p) over the
support:
[(1− b)pxB , pxA) ∪ [p˜(x), pxB ]
and plays price p = pxB with probability ΦA =
1−a
b .
















The reasoning behind this case is similar to case 2. But now, if the infimum of the
support of prices charged by firm A is (1 − b)pxB then firm B no longer wants to set a
price below (1 − b)pxB in order to sell to consumer x with probability 1. However, when
pxA ≥ (1 − b)pxB another discontinuity of firm B’s expected profit with respect to its
targeted price potentially occurs at pB(x) = p
x
A. In particular, whenever firm B charges
higher prices in equilibrium the support of price distributions for both firms cannot be
connected. This happens when (1− b)pxB ≤ pxA < (1−b)p
x
B
2−a−b . But then we ask: which price
above pxA and below p
x
B , call it p˜(x), makes firm B indifferent between charging this price,
charging pxA or charging (1− b)pxB? Then p˜(x) must be such that
• Charging pB(x) = pxA must yield (1−b)pxB : (1−a)pxA+a(1−F 3iA (pxA))pxA = (1−b)pxB ,
• Charging pB(x) = p˜(x) must yield (1− b)pxB : a(1− F 3iA (p˜(x))p˜(x) = (1− b)pxB ,




A (p˜(x)) we obtain that:











pxA − (1− b)pxB
apxA
= F 3iA (p˜(x)),
we then have that
1− F 3iA (pxA) = 1−
pxA − (1− b)pxB
apxA
=
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)pxA
apxA
.
We find p˜(x) in the following way:
a(
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)pxA
apxA
)p˜(x) = (1− b)pxB ;
p˜(x) =
pxA(1− b)pxB
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)pxA
.
It must also be the case that firm B obtains a payoff equal to (1 − b)pxB for any price it
charges arbitrarily close to but below pxB . But then firm A must play p
x
B with positive
probability, call it ΦA. We find that:




Let us now switch to the equilibrium price conditions for firm A.
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• Charging pA(x) ∼ pxA must yield (1− b)pxB :
limpA(x)→pxA(1− b)pA(x) + b(1− F 3iB (pA(x)))pA(x) = (1− b)pxB
or
(1− b)pxA + b(1− limpA(x)→pxAF 3iB (pA(x)))pA(x) = (1− b)pxB .
• Charging pA(x) = p˜(x) must yield (1− b)pxB : (1− b)p˜(x) + b(1− F 3iA (p˜(x))p˜(x) =
(1− b)pxB .
These conditions imply that firm B must attach a positive probability to playing pB(x) =
pxA and firm A will charge all prices close to and strictly below p
x
A but price equal to p
x
A
(this interval of prices for A is open at pxA) since there is a positive probability it will
have to ‘share’ the consumer since firm B plays this price with positive mass. Call this
probability ΦB . We find that ΦA =
1−a
b . What is left to determine are the probability
distributions F 3iA (p) and F
3
B(p).
For p ∈ ((1− b)pxB , pxA) we have that:
(1− a)p+ a(1− F 3iA (p))p = (1− b)pxB and (1− b)p+ b(1− F 3iB (p))p = (1− b)pxB ,
hence
F 3iA (p) = 1−
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)p
ap
and F 3iB (p) = 1−
(1− b)(pxB − p)
bp
.
For p ∈ [p˜(x), pxB) we have that:
(1− F 3iA (p))p = (1− b)pxB and (1− b)p+ b(1− F 3iB (p))p = (1− b)pxB ,
hence
F 3iA (p) = 1−
(1− b)pxB
ap
and F 3iB (p) = 1−
(1− b)(pxB − p)
bp
.















Let F 3iij (p) be the probability distribution of prices of firm j = A,B in case 3ii in
equilibrium in case 3ii. This case is very similar to the previous one (when (1 − b)pxB ≤
pxA <
(1−b)pxB





pxA ≥ pxB .
Note that when pxA < p
x
B then there is no price p˜(x) < p
x
B as defined above that would
make firm B indifferent between selling to the consumer only when firm A also recognizes
the consumer and selling at price pxA guaranteeing to sell to the consumer in the event
that firm A does not recognize the consumer. We then have for p ∈ ((1− b)pxB , pxA) that:
(1− a)p+ a(1− F 3iiA (p))p = (1− b)pxB and (1− b)p+ b(1− F 3iiB (p))p = (1− b)pxB ,
hence
F 3iiA (p) = 1−
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)p
ap
and F 3iiB (p) = 1−




and we equally find that
Φ3iiA =
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)p
apxA
and Φ3iiB =
(1− b)(pxB − pxA)
bpxA
,




B is the probability
mass firm B assigns to price pxA.
Finally in the case that pxA ≥ pxB , the easiest case, the firms will randomize their prices
over the interval [(1− b)pxB , pxB) and in order for firm B to obtain positive profits (equal
to (1− b)pxB), firm A will assign probability mass a−bb to price pxB which is the supremum
of the support of prices for both firms. For p ∈ [(1− b)pxB , pxB) we have that:
(1− a)p+ a(1− F 3iiA (p))p = (1− b)pxB and (1− b)p+ b(1− F 3iiB (p))p = (1− b)pxB ,
hence
F 3iiA (p) = 1−
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)p
ap
and F 3iiB (p) = 1−
(1− b)(pxB − p)
bp
.
Step III. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria when (1− a)pxA = (1− b)pxB
We now construct the equilibrium strategies of two mixed strategy equilibria when
(1 − a)pxA = (1 − b)pxB . The two equilibria will be the ones obtained in the limit when
(1− a)pxA approaches (1− b)pxB from below and from above. The expected payoff for both
firms is equivalent in both equilibria and equal to (1− a)pxA = (1− b)pxB .
Equilibrium 1: When (1− a)pxA approaches (1− b)pxB from below the highest price
played in equilibrium is anchored at pxB , a property which is preserved in the limit. Note
that since a ≥ b we have that pxA ≥ pxB . Hence the Nash equilibrium is the one that we
have just described in the previous paragraph. the firms will randomize their prices over
the interval [(1− b)pxB , pxB) and in order for firm B to obtain positive profits (equal to
(1− b)pxB), firm A will assign probability mass a−bb to price pxB which is the supremum of
the support of prices for both firms. For p ∈ [(1− b)pxB , pxB) we have that:
(1− a)p+ a(1− F 3iiA (p))p = (1− b)pxB and (1− b)p+ b(1− F 3iiB (p))p = (1− b)pxB ,
hence
F 3iiA (p) = 1−
(1− b)pxB − (1− a)p
ap
and F 3iiB (p) = 1−
(1− b)(pxB − p)
bp
.
It is immediately checked that any individual deviation to any other price cannot
strictly increase expected profit. Firm B will not charge any price below (1− b)pxB as this
would yield lower expected utility. The most she can hope for from charging a higher price
is (1 − a)pxA, but this is equal to (1 − b)pxB . If firm A deviates to any other prices than
prices in the interval [(1− b)pxB , pxB ] her expected profits will be lower than (1− b)pxB .
Equilibrium 2: When (1− a)pxA approaches (1− b)pxB from above the highest price
played in equilibrium is anchored at pxA, a property which is again preserved in the limit.
To characterize this equilibrium we just need to switch the firms’ labels in the above
proof. It is the case that pxB ≥ (1 − a)pxA and hence we are in case 3 of the above proof.
In particular since
(1− a)pxA
2− a− b =
(1− b)pxB




We are in the second sub-case of case 3 while pxB ≤ pxA, which is the yields the equilibrium
of the first sub-case. We then have for p ∈ ((1− a)pxA, pxB) that:
(1− b)p+ a(1− F 3iiB (p))p = (1− a)pxA and (1− a)p+ a(1− F 3iiA (p))p = (1− a)pxA,
hence
F 3iiB (p) = 1−
(1− a)pxA − (1− b)p
bp
and F 3iiA (p) = 1−
(1− a)(pxA − p)
ap
,
and we equally find that
Φ3iiB =
(1− a)pxA − (1− b)p
bpxB
and Φ3iiA =
(1− a)(pxA − pxB)
apxB
,




A is the probability
mass firm A assigns to price pxB .
For the same reasons as equilibrium 1, it is immediately checked that any individual
deviation to any other price cannot strictly increase expected profit.
Expected payoff. It follows immediately from the equilibrium strategies that the
expected payoff for both firms is equal to
(1− a)pxA = (1− b)pxB .
7.2 Perfectly correlated profiling technologies
7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Stage 2. Denote by p˜ii(p) firm i’s expected profit obtained from consumer x when
pricing pi(x) = p at stage 2. These profits are conditional on being on segments where
personalized prices are relevant (i.e., the A-translucent and transparent segments for firm
A, with probability λ, and the transparent segment for firm B, with probability βλ).
Supposing that firm B draws its price pB (x) from some distribution G
x
B (p) that is defined
on the interval [(1− β)pxB , pxB ], let us show that firm A achieves the same expected profit
when playing pA(x) = (1− β) pxB or pA(x) = pxB . As GxB((1− β) pxB) = 0 and GxB(pxB) = 1,
we have indeed that
p˜iA((1− β) pxB) = (1− β)2 pxB + β (1−GxB((1− β) pxB)) (1− β) pxB = (1− β) pxB ,
p˜iA(p
x
B) = (1− β) pxB + β (1−GxB(pxB)) pxB = (1− β) pxB .
For firm A to be indifferent among any price p ∈ [(1− β)pxB , pxB ], its expected profit must
always be equal to (1− β) pxB ; that is p˜iA(p) = (1− β) p + β(1 − GxB(p))p = (1− β) pxB ,
from which we obtain
GxB(p) =
p− (1− β) pxB
βp
= Gx (p) .
Suppose now that firm A plays the following strategy for any consumer x: with prob-
ability ∆A, it draws pa (x) from some distribution G
x
A (p) that is defined on the interval
[(1− β)pxB , pxB ], while with probability 1−∆A, it sets pa (x) = pxB . As GxA((1− β) pxB) = 0,
firm B’s expected profit from playing pB(x) = (1− β)pxB is equal to
p˜iB((1− β)pxB) = ∆A (1−GxA((1− β) pxB)) (1− β) pxB + (1−∆A) (1− β) pxB = (1− β) pxB .
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(∆A (1−GxA(p)) p+ (1−∆A) p) = (1−∆A) pxB .
For firm B to be indifferent between playing pB(x) = (1−β)pxB or pB(x) = pxB , firm A must
choose ∆A such that (1− β) pxB = (1−∆A) pxB , or ∆A = β. In addition, firm B must also
be indifferent between any p ∈ [(1− β)pxB , pxB ], which requires (1− β) p+β(1−GxA(p))p =
(1− β) pxB , which is equivalent to
GxA(p) =
p− (1− β) pxB
βp
= Gx (p) .
Given that pB > 0, it follows that for any x such that r (x) > 0, both firms make positive
expected profits equal to (1− β) pxB = (1− β) min {pB , r (x)}.
Stage 1. In any mixed strategy equilibrium, firm B must be indifferent between charg-
ing any price p in the support of HB , pl, limp→pm , and r¯. Recall that by choosing r¯, firm
B can secure a profit of piminB = β (1− β)λrˆ. If firm B chooses some price p, then with
probability βλ, firm B competes for consumers on the transparent segment and will obtain
expected profits of p˚iB(p); with probability 1 − βλ, firm B does not recognize consumers
and will only obtain positive profits if firm A does not recognize consumers either (the
segment is opaque), which happens with probability (1− λ) / (1− βλ) (conditional on the
event in which firm B does not recognize a consumer). Therefore, the probability that
firm B is active on the opaque segment is (1 − λ). Given that with probability ∇A, firm
A draws pA from the distribution HA (p) defined on [pl, p
m] and, with probability 1−∇A,
sets pA = p
m, we can compute firm B’s expected profit from choosing price p as
ΠeB(p) = βλp˚iB(p) + (1− λ)p (1− F (p)) [(1−∇A) +∇A (1−HA (p))] .
As firm B must be indifferent between charging any price p in the support of HB and r¯,
we must have that ΠeB(p) = pi
min
B , from which we obtain
HA (p) =
βλ (˚piB(p)− (1− β) rˆ) + (1− λ)p (1− F (p))
(1− λ)p(1− F (p))∇A
= 1− βλ ((1− β) rˆ − p˚iB(p))− (1− λ) (1−∇A) p (1− F (p))
(1− λ)p(1− F (p))∇A .




(1− β) rf(r)dr + βλ
∫ r¯
pl




(1− β) rf(r)dr + (βλ (1− β) + 1− λ) pl (1− F (pl)) .
As firmB must be indifferent between charging pl and r¯, we have that Π
e
B(pl) = βλ (1− β) rˆ,
which implicitly defines pl as a function of β, λ and F :
pl =




(βλ (1− β) + 1− λ) (1− F (pl)) .
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As HA (p
m) = 1, firm B’s expected profit from charging pmis obtained as follows
ΠeB(p
m) = βλp˚iB(p
m) + (1− λ)pm (1− F (pm)) (1−∇A) ,








(1− λ)pim > 0.
It must also be that ∇A > 0. This is satisfied when








When this condition is not satisfied, then ∇A = 0 and firm A plays pA = pm with
probability 1. In this case, firm B’s optimal response is to play pB = r¯ with probability
1. In other words, we obtain an equilibrium in pure strategies in which firm A will be a
monopolist in markets for consumers which are not identified, while firm B gives up any
sales to consumers it does not identify and chooses a price that maximizes its expected
profits in the transparent segment.
Now assume that ∇A > 0, it must be that firm A is indifferent between charging pm
and pl. Denote by pˆiA(∇B , HB) the expected profit of firm A given firm B’s regular price
strategy. We then have:
ΠeA (p) = λpˆiA(∇B , HB) + (1− λ) p (1− F (p)) (1−∇B +∇B (1−HB (p))) .
As HB (p
m) = 1 and HB (pl) = 0, it follows that
ΠeA (p
m) = λpˆiA(∇B , HB) + (1− λ) pm (1− F (pm)) (1−∇B) ,
ΠeA (pl) = λpˆiA(∇B , HB) + (1− λ) pl (1− F (pl)) .
For firm A to be indifferent, we need ΠeA (p
m) = ΠeA (pl), which is equivalent to
1−∇B = pl (1− F (pl))




Since pil ≤ pim, it must be that ∇B ∈ [0, 1]. It must also be the case that ΠeA(p) = ΠeA(pl),
from which we obtain
HB (p) = 1− pil − p (1− F (p)) (1−∇B)
p (1− F (p))∇B = 1−
pil − p (1− F (p)) pilpim





p (1− F (p)) − 1
)
.
This completes the proof.
7.2.2 Comparative statics results
Proof of Corollary 1.
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1. Let us show that ∂pl∂λ > 0. We have that








Totally differentiating with respect to λ we obtain
∂pl
∂λ
[(βλ (1− β) + 1− λ) (1− F (pl)− plf(pl))] + pl (β (1− β)− 1) (1− F (pl))
























= β (1− β)
rˆ − ∫ pl
0
rf(r)dr − pl(1− F (pl))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
+ pl(1− F (pl)).
Since pl < p




0, from which we obtain that A > 0. Also note that (1− β) rˆ = p˚iB(r¯) > p˚iB(pl) =
(1− β) (∫ pl
0
rf(r)dr + pl(1− F (pl))
)
and hence B > 0. From this, it follows that
∂pl
∂λ > 0.























(1− λ)2 < 0,
which can be rewritten as:
∂∇A
∂λ
= −ηA × 1
λ (1− λ) < 0.
3. Let us show that ∂HA(p)∂λ > 0 . Recall that:
HA(p) = 1−
β (1− β) (rˆ − ∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
























Grouping terms, we obtain
∂HA(p)
∂λ
= −β (1− β) (rˆ −
∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
p(1− F (p)) ×







Note that ∇A − ∂∇A∂λ λ(1− λ) = 1− ηA + ηA = 1 and hence we have
∂HA(p)
∂λ
= −β (1− β) (rˆ −
∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))





λ (1− λ) (∇A)2
.
Since
β (1− β) (rˆ − ∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
p(1− F (p))
=
β (1− β)λ(rˆ − ∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))





















λ (1− λ) (∇A)2
+
ηA
λ (1− λ) (∇A)2
= 0.
4. Let us show that ∂∇B∂λ < 0. Recall that ∇B = 1 − pl(1−F (pl)pim . Since ∂pl∂λ > 0 and
pl < p





∂λ (1− F (pl)− plf(pl))
pim
< 0.
5. Let us show that ∂HB(p)∂λ < 0. Recalling that
HB(p) = 1− 1−∇B∇B ×
(
pim













and hence ∂HB(p)∂λ < 0 since
∂∇B(p)
∂λ < 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. We demonstrate here that for high levels of asymmetry
(β < 12 ), increasing β increases the uniform prices, whereas the opposite is true when the
level of symmetry is high (β > 12 ). That is, we show
∂pl
∂β

















1. Let us show that ∂pl∂β > 0⇐⇒ β < 12 . We have that








Totally differentiating with respect to β we obtain
∂pl
∂β
[(βλ (1− β) + 1− λ) (1− F (pl)− plf(pl))] + plλ (1− 2β) (1− F (pl))
























= λ (1− 2β)
rˆ − ∫ pl
0
rf(r)dr − pl(1− F (pl))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
 .
Since pl < p




0, from which we obtain that A > 0. Also note that (1− β) rˆ = p˚iB(r¯) > p˚iB(pl)) =
(1− β) (∫ pl
0
rf(r)dr + pl(1− F (pl))
)
and hence B > 0. From this, it follows that
∂pl
∂β S 0⇐⇒ β R 12 .
2. Let us evaluate ∂∇A∂β . Recall that





























= −ηA × 1− 2β




3. We now turn to ∂HA(p)∂β . Recall that:
HA(p) = 1− β (1− β)∇A
λ(rˆ − ∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
(1− λ)p(1− F (p)) +
1−∇A







rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))














rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
(1− λ)p(1− F (p)) ×








 1−∇Aβ(1− β) − λ(rˆ −
∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
(1− λ)p(1− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
 .
Note that, since p ≤ pm, we have
λ(rˆ − ∫ p
0
rf(r)dr − p(1− F (p)))
(1− λ)p(1− F (p)) ≥
λ(rˆ − ∫ pm
0
rf(r)dr − pm(1− F (pm)))
(1− λ)pm(1− F (pm)) =
1−∇A
β (1− β) .
Hence we obtain that C ≤ 0, which implies that ∂HA(p)∂β S 0 ⇐⇒ β S 12 . In
other words, when β is low, increasing β increases prices on the opaque segment,
as firms avoid cut-throat competition. In other words, when β is relatively high,
increasing β make the firms even more symmetric, thereby increasing competition
and lowering prices.
4. Now we consider ∂∇B∂β . Recall that ∇B = 1 − pl(1−F (pl)pim . We then obtain, since
∂pl






∂β (1− F (pl)− plf(pl))
pim
S 0⇐⇒ β S 1
2
.
5. We finally discuss the sign of ∂HB(p)∂β . As
HB(p) = 1− 1−∇B∇B ×
(
pim




















Proof of Corollary 3. Let us consider ∂G
x(p)



















> 0 for any p < pxB .
Profit ranking. We establish here that the better-informed firm (firm A) earns higher
expected profits than the less-informed firm (firm B).
We know that firms are indifferent between all equilibrium uniform prices. Hence,
the expected profit from any uniform price is equal to the expected profit from playing
the lowest possible uniform price pl. When setting their price equal to pl, both firms
have the same expected profit from the opaque segment. Moreover, firm A gets additional
profits from the translucent segment since she has a lower targeted price than firm B’s
observed uniform price. Finally, the expected profit from the transparent market is higher
for firm A than for firm B, since firm B minimizes profits from the transparent market by
setting pB = pl. Firm A’s expected profits on the transparent market are averaged over
all possible uniform prices firm B may choose, either between pl and p
m or equal to r¯, and
these expected profits do not depend on its own uniform price, pA. Adding these three
effects, we see that A enjoys higher expected profits.
7.2.3 Uniform distribution
Suppose that consumer valuations are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and, to
ease the exposition, define k ≡ β (1− β). We know from Proposition 3 that the mixed-
strategy equilibrium in uniform prices is as follows: with probability 1−∇A, firm A plays
pA = p
m and with probability ∇A, it draws a price from the distribution HA(p) defined
on [pl, p
m); with probability 1 −∇B , firm B plays pB = r¯ = 1 and with probability ∇B ,
it draws a price from the distribution HB(p) defined on [pl, p
m). Then, supposing that
2(1− λ) > λk, we find the following results:32
∇A = 2(1− λ)− λk
2(1− λ) , ∇B =
(
2(1− λ)− λk






(2 (1− λ) + λk) p− λk
2 (1− λ)− λk ,
HB (p) =
(2 (1− λ) (1− p)− λkp) (2 (1− λ) p− λk (1− p))
p (1− p) (2(1− λ)− λk)2 ,
pl =
λk





It is readily checked that ∇A, ∇B , HA (p), and HB (p) are decreasing function of λ and
k, while pl is an increasing function of λ and k. This means first, as stated in Corollary
1, that the distributions of uniform prices are pushed to the right for both firms when
profiling abilities improve. Second, recalling that k ≡ β (1− β) is bell-shaped in β with a
maximum at β = 1/2, we also have that the distribution of uniform prices of both firms
32If 2(1 − λ) ≤ λk, then ∇A = ∇B = 0, meaning that, with probability 1, firm A sets
pA = 1/2 and firm B sets pB = 1. See Appendix 7.2.2 for the detailed computations.
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Figure 5: Impact of improved profiling on price distributions
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are also pushed to the right when β comes closer to 1/2, as indicated in Corollary 2. Third,
we observe in this example that HB (p) > HA (p) for all p, meaning that firm B always
puts more weight on lower prices than firm A whenever both firms randomize. Figure 5
illustrates these results by representing HA (p) and HB (p) for different values of λ and β:




3 ), the second is HA (p)
for (λ, β) = ( 12 ,
2




3 ), and the fourth is HA (p) for
(λ, β) = (34 ,
1
2 ).
Let F (.) be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. It follows that the average valuation (rˆ)
and the monopoly price (pm) are both equal to 1/2; the monopoly profit is computed as




(1− β)rf(r)dr + (1− β)p(1− F (p)) = (1− β)(p− 12p2),
and piminB =
1
2λβ(1− β). The lower bound of uniform price pl is then defined by
pl =
βλ(1− β)(rˆ − ∫ pl
0
rf(r)dr)
(βλ(1− β) + 1− λ)(1− F (pl)) ⇔ pl =
βλ(1− β)
2(1− λ) + βλ(1− β) .
We observe that pl is increasing in λ, increasing in β if β ≤ 1/2, and decreasing in β if
β > 1/2. This implies that the uniform price is less dispersed as tracking technologies
become more precise and the difference in profiling technologies between the two firms are
neither too large nor too small (i.e., pl is at the highest level when β = 1/2).
The probability of firm A randomizing its uniform price is defined by








= 1− βλ(1− β)
2(1− λ) .
This probability is decreasing in λ, decreasing in β if β ≤ 1/2, and increasing in β if
β > 1/2.
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When 2(1−λ) ≤ βλ(1−β), we have ∇A = 0, so that firm A plays pA = pm = 1/2 with
probability 1, whereas firm B plays pB = 1 with probability 1. When 2(1−λ) > βλ(1−β),
we have ∇A > 0; the probability of firm B randomizing its uniform is then defined by
∇B = 1− pl(1− F (pl))
pm(1− F (pm)) =
(
2(1− λ)− βλ(1− β)
2(1− λ) + βλ(1− β)
)2
.
The latter probability is decreasing in λ, decreasing in β if β ≤ 1/2, and increasing in β if
β > 1/2.
Thus, firm B plays pB = 1 with probability 1 −∇B , and draws a price from [pl, 1/2]
with probability ∇B and with a distribution
HB(p) = 1− 1−∇B∇B
(
1
4p(1− p) − 1
)
,
which is increasing in ∇B .
Firm A plays pA = 1/2 with probability 1−∇A, and draws a price from [pl, 1/2] with









Effect of improved profiling on consumer surplus. Suppose that β = 1/2
and λ > 8/9, which implies that 2(1− λ)− βλ(1− β) < 0, so that ∇A = 0. Under these
conditions, firm A plays pA = p
m = 1/2 with probability 1, whereas firm B plays pB = 1
with probability 1. Consumers thus face the monopoly price when they remain anonymous.
For the consumers whom they profile, both firms draw their personalized price from the
interval [r/2, r] according to the distribution function G(p) = 2 − (r/p), with density
g(p) = r/p2. Hence, when consumers are profiled only by firm A, they face one draw from
G(p). When they are profiled by both firms, they face the minimum of two draws from
G(p), which follows the distribution Γ (p) = G(p)2, with density γ(p) = 2G(p)g(p).
Suppose that β = 1/2 and λ > 8/9, which implies that 2(1 − λ) − βλ(1 − β) < 0, so
that ∇A = 0. Under these conditions, firm A plays pA = pm = 1/2 with probability 1,
whereas firm B plays pB = 1 with probability 1. Consumer surplus is then computed as:
































dr = (1− λ)1
8
+ λ











4− 5 ln 2
4
=
7− 10 ln 2
8
≈ 0, 0086 > 0.
For any λ > 8/9, firm A’s expected profit is computed as:




































































r r−pp2 dpdr = λ
1
4 (1− ln 2) ,
which is an increasing function of λ (as ln 2 < 1).
7.3 Proof of the result in Example 5.4
Personalized prices. Note first that the second stage equilibrium prices are still




βp for p ∈ [(1− β)p′xB , p′xB ] ,
0 otherwise.
Where p′xB ≡ min {pA, pB , r (x)} . Given any uniform prices pA and pB , the expected
payoff from personalized pricing is equal to p˜i = (1− β) p′xB . Note that we assume that
in stage one, no firm will charge more than ζ and hence that p′xB ≡ min {pA, pB , r (x)} =
min {pA, pB , } .
Uniform prices. Note that in any subgame-perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,
players must choose prices from the same interval and only the upper bound of the interval
can be assigned positive mass by at most one firm. No firm wants to charge a price below
the lower bound of the interval since this decreases both first stage and second stage
expected profits. No firms wants to charge a price above the upper bound of the interval
since this will guarantee zero profits on anonymous consumers and does not affect expected
profits obtained from personalized pricing. Now take any price p in the interval different
from the upper bound and suppose that at least one firm, say firm A, plays this price with
positive probability. Firm B should be indifferent between playing price p and any other
price p′ in the interval. However, since firm A plays p with positive probability, firm B
will always find a price p′ = p −  that will guarantee higher profits: instead of sharing
the consumers at this price p it can sell to the consumer for sure by slightly undercutting
price p. However, it cannot be firm B that plays the upper bound, p = ζ with positive
probability. The expected payoff to firms A and B from setting a uniform price equal to




















+(1− λ)p [1−∇A +∇A(1−HA(p))] .
The first term is the expected payoff from personalized pricing given that the other
firm follows the strategies as defined in the proposed mixed strategy equilibrium. The
second term is the expected profits to be obtained from consumers it will not recognize
given that the other firm follows the strategies as defined in the proposed mixed strategy
equilibrium.
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Suppose first that ∇A < 1 and hence that ∇B = 1. Now consider the expected payoff




(1− β)ρhB(ρ)dρ+ (1− β)p(1−HB(p))
}
+ (1− λ)p [1−HB(p)] .










(1− λ)phB(p)− (1−HB(p))(1− λ+ (1− β)λ) = 0.
The explicit solution of this differential equation is HB(p) = cp
− 1−λβ1−λ + 1. But then it
must be that HB(ζ) = 1 = cζ
− 1−λβ1−λ + 1 and hence that c = 0, a contradiction.
Suppose now that ∇B < 1 and hence that ∇A = 1. Then, the expected payoff to firm




(1− β)ρhA(ρ)dρ+ (1− β)p(1−HA(p))
}
+ (1− λ)p [1−HA(p)] .




. We hence have





(1− λ)phA(p)− (1−HA(p))(1− λ+ (1− β)βλ) = 0.
The explicit solution of this differential equation is HA(p) = cp
− 1−λ+(1−β)βλ1−λ + 1. But
then it must be that HA(ζ) = 1 = cζ
− 1−λ+(1−β)βλ1−λ + 1 and hence that c = 0, again a
contradiction.
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